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1ABSTRACT. The author takes a comprehensive look at the government’s policy of technology transfer, the
process by which government-funded inventions are transferred to the private sector for commercialization.
Emphasis is placed on biomedical R&D and, in particular, on pharmaceutical drugs. The author describes
how the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 fundamentally altered the government’s approach to tech transfer. He explains
why the Act is viewed as a success, and presents the three most signiﬁcant current debates over the policy’s
future. These debates, the author argues, can be informed by careful study of how tech transfer operates
in practice. For this reason, the author then presents, in narrative form, the development of Zerit, an
eﬀective AIDS medication supported by government funding and then transferred to Bristol-Myers Squibb for
commercialization. This narrative is then used by the author to inform the three current debates over tech
transfer. The author ﬁnds that the Bayh-Dole Act is generally successful, but that the government should do
more to ensure that taxpayers are maximizing the return on their investment. The author also ﬁnds that the
government should take greater care to consider not only international trade, but also public health, national
security and ethical responsibility, when deciding whether to exercise government rights to taxpayer-funded
inventions.
Introduction
Technology transfer, the policy that regulates the transfer of government-funded inventions to the private
sector for commercialization, plays a critical role in promoting economic growth, improving public health,
and ensuring national security. Twenty years have passed since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 fundamentally
altered the government’s approach to this policy. The Act, which encouraged the use of exclusive licenses to
stimulate private commercialization of government-funded inventions, is now widely heralded as a success. In
the ﬁeld of biomedical research, the number of FDA-approved medications has skyrocketed, and hundreds of
small biotech ﬁrms are busy pushing potential medications through the product pipeline. But the Act is not
without critics. Some label the policy an unnecessary corporate windfall; others argue that it is constricting
the free and open exchange of information that is essential to scientiﬁc progress.
This article takes a comprehensive look at just how successful the Bayh-Dole regime of technology transfer
has been in the ﬁeld of biomedical research. Section I provides both an overview of tech transfer and a review
2of its historical development. In Section II, the author examines why many believe Bayh-Dole is a success.
Then, the three main debates that dominate discussion over the future of tech transfer are presented: whether
exclusive licenses are in fact necessary to encourage commercialization, whether taxpayers are maximizing
the return on their investment, and whether the policy might be unintentionally impeding scientiﬁc progress.
The author argues that each of these debates suﬀers from a lack of information and could be informed by
careful study of the development of particular drugs.
Section III consists of a narrative account of the development of Zerit, an eﬀective AIDS medication supported
by government funding and then transferred to Bristol-Myers (now Bristol-Myers Squibb) for commercializa-
tion. This narrative is then used, in Section IV, to inform the three current debates. The author ﬁnds that
the development of Zerit largely conﬁrms that the exclusive licenses encouraged by Bayh-Dole are having
their desired impact. Nevertheless, Zerit also indicates that some tinkering in the policy may be in order.
Speciﬁcally, Zerit reveals that taxpayers may not be maximizing the return on their investment, and that
concerns that Bayh-Dole is restricting the open exchange of scientiﬁc data should be taken very seriously.
Zerit also reveals that the government should take greater care to exercise its rights to government-funded
inventions in accord with not only international trade, but also public health, national security and ethical
responsibility. Finally, the author recommends making tech transfer more eﬀective by distinguishing essential
medicines like Zerit from other medicines, and then reserving for the government greater background rights
in the former.
3I.
Technology Transfer: The Public Pursuit of Scientiﬁc Progress
Technology transfer policy is as complex as the ever-changing research and development (R&D) that it
regulates. This section of the article provides an overview of this complicated policy and describes how it
evolved to its current state. As the focus of this article is pharmaceutical drug development, special attention
is given to the biomedical R&D funded and coordinated by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The
section concludes with a discussion of ﬁve salient features of the policy’s historical development.
I.A. Introduction to Technology Transfer
In a sentence, technology transfer is the process by which government-funded inventions are transferred to
the private sector for further development and commercialization.
Technological advance is often depicted as the product of enterprising individuals who, motivated by either
professional prestige or ﬁnancial success, discover the medicines and the machines that push society forward.
It is a beautiful image, but it is also somewhat of an over-simpliﬁcation. Technological advance is in fact the
product of a complex array of incentives and actions. It is certainly driven, in part, by individuals seeking
prestige, pursuing personal proﬁt, or perhaps just scratching an inventive itch. It is also driven, in part, by
luck. And it is also driven, in part, by the government.
There are a number of rationales supporting government support for technological and scientiﬁc progress.
First, inventors motivated by ﬁnancial proﬁt need property rights – patents – to secure their potential
inventions. To induce these inventors to work their magic, the government passes patent laws, secures
4property rights, and guarantees enforcement of those rights. Second, government intervention is at times
necessary to overcome market failure. Private industry, for example, may be discouraged from engaging in
research that takes too long or is too risky (such as basic, foundational biological research). Such endeavors
are not well suited to a corporation’s purpose, namely, maximizing shareholder value. Alternatively, market
failure may occur where maximum proﬁt does not align with maximum human health and welfare. There is
more proﬁt, for example, in a pill taken once a day for the rest of a patient’s life than there is in a vaccination
that individuals need take only once.
The third reason why the government may decide to stimulate R&D is simply to speed things up. Patents
may be enough to encourage private investors and inventors to discover pharmaceutical drugs. But, why wait
for private investors and inventors to cure cancer or AIDS? Why not speed up the process by contributing
public funds to the cause? Fourth, and ﬁnally, the government may wish to stimulate R&D because tech-
nological advance stimulates overall economic growth. The Internet is perhaps the most salient example of
how a government-funded invention can drive economic growth. Similarly, pharmaceutical drugs stimulate
economic growth by making workers more productive (fewer sick days and longer lives) and reducing the
costs of procedures and hospitalization.
For these reasons, the government spends billions of dollars annually on R&D in biomedicine, defense and
countless other ﬁelds. The NIH, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and many other government agencies fulﬁll their mission
at least in part by supporting technological advance. In 1995, federal funding accounted for approximately
36% of total national outlays for R&D, and 58% of outlays for basic research.1
1Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663, 1667 (1996).
5The value of spending a portion of the federal budget on such R&D is, for the above-mentioned rationales,
clear and uncontroversial. Evidence of this is the fact that both the Clinton and the Bush administrations
backed signiﬁcant increases in the NIH budget. At the same time, unclear and quite controversial is how to
get the most mileage out of this government support. Who should receive this funding? What background
rights should taxpayers retain in inventions? Some argue for leaving these inventions in the public domain.
This enables future scientiﬁc progress to build oﬀ of past achievements. It also opens the door for multiple
private entities to commercialize the product, ensuring an open, competitive market among suppliers. On
the other hand, if an invention is left in the public domain, then it is possible that no company will risk
investing in its commercialization. If this occurs, and the invention is left to languish on the ﬂoor of a
government laboratory, then nobody beneﬁts.
Determining the proper level of incentives that are necessary to ensure that government-funded inventions are
commercialized has driven and continues to drive the development of tech transfer. The incentive typically
comes in the form of property rights, either patents or licenses, to the invention. The nature of these property
rights is the central focus of this paper. The fundamental goal of technology transfer policy is to strike a
balance between the rights of private industry and the rights of the taxpayers in a way that maximizes public
welfare.
I.B. Technology Transfer in Practice: Focus on Biomedical Technology
Before turning to the historical development of tech transfer policy, it is worth taking a snapshot of how
the policy works. Again, as the focus of this article is pharmaceutical drug development, special attention
6is given to R&D coordinated by the NIH.
I.B.1. A Giant Public-Private Partnership
The process of drug development might be viewed as one giant public-private partnership. In the words of Jeﬀ
Trewhitt, a spokesman for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), “there has
been an honorable division of labor.”2 This division of labor generally works as follows: Taxpayers support
foundational research into potential health care technologies in the preclinical phase (both in government
laboratories and at universities), and then private industry supports further development. This further
development typically involves clinical trials, the FDA approval process and commercialization. All phases
of drug development are risky. PhRMA reports that of every 5,000 medicines that are tested, only 0.1% (5)
emerge from the preclinical phase. Of these ﬁve medications, only 20% (1) survives clinical testing and the
approval process. The federal government funds about 42% of all health care research. The private sector
funds about 55%, and the remainder is funded by other government agencies and by nonproﬁt institutions,
such as foundations.3 Thus it may fairly be said that taxpayers play a signiﬁcant and essential role in the
drug development process, and the same may fairly be said of private industry. Indeed PhRMA reports that
“the value of both public- and private-sector research to patients is priceless.”4
2Taxpayers Pay Twice for New Medicines (visited July 24, 2001) <www.cnn.com>.
3It is estimated that nationwide total spending on health-related R&D in 1999 was $45.5 billion: $19.2 billion contributed by
the government (42%), $24.8 billion contributed by industry (55%), and the remainder contributed by private foundations and
nonproﬁt organizations. These ﬁgures do not include the numerous tax breaks given to private industry conducting biomedical
R&D. Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The Unrecognized and
Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed Upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part From Federally Funded
Research, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 631, 636 (2000).
4Why Do Prescription Drugs Cost So Much? (visited June 21, 2001) <www.pharma.org> [hereinafter Why Drugs Cost So
Much].
7Taxpayer support for health care R&D is primarily coordinated by the NIH, which is comprised of 27
institutes and centers whose collective mission is to “sponsor and conduct medical research and research
training that leads to better health for all Americans.”5 In ﬁscal year 2001, the NIH received $20.3 billion
in support of its mission. In 2002, the NIH budget was roughly $23 billion, an increase of 13.5%. This
sizable increase is an indication that the Bush administration is, at it has stated, committed to continuing
a ﬁve-year plan to double the budget of NIH by ﬁscal year 2003.6
Within the NIH, the Oﬃce of Technology Transfer (OTT) coordinates the transfer of both “intramural”
and “extramural” research. Intramural research is conducted by federally-employed scientists working in
government-owned laboratories. The government retains title to inventions discovered intramurally. Then,
in exchange for royalty payments, the government gives to private industry licenses to develop and sell
the technology. Extramural research, on the other hand, is conducted by privately-employed scientists
using government grants. Much of this research is conducted in university labs. Under the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980,7 title to inventions developed extramurally is held not by the government/grantor but by the
university/grantee. The government nevertheless retains certain background rights in these inventions. Of
the $20.3 billion that NIH received in ﬁscal year 2001, $2.4 billion, or 12%,8 was allocated to in-house,
intramural research, while 84% was allocated to extramural research.9
I.B.2. Intramural Research
5Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, NIH Response to the Conference
Report Request for a Plan to Ensure Taxpayers’ Interests are Protected: A Plan to Ensure Taxpayers’ Interests
are Protected (July 2001) at 3 [hereinafter NIH Response].
6Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, Press Release for FY2002 Presi-
dent’s Budget (Apr. 9, 2001).
7Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-3028 (codiﬁed as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§200-211, 301-307 (1994))
[hereinafter Bayh-Dole].
8Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, NIH Investments (visited Nov. 10, 2001)
<www.nih.gov/news/BudgetFY2002/FY2001investments.htm#introduction> [hereinafter NIH Investments].
9NIH Response, supra note 5, at 3.
8In ﬁscal year 2001, the NIH allocated roughly $2.4 billion to intramural research, research conducted by
federally-employed scientists working in government labs. In accord with the mission of the NIH, these
scientists conduct research that enhances human health. Along the way, the government may either seek
patent protection for these inventions and/or engage in licensing agreements with companies interested in
the drugs’ commercialization.10 The government may receive royalty payments for intramural discoveries
that are ultimately commercialized by private industry.
The process of patenting an intramural invention is overseen by the OTT. To preserve U.S. patent rights,
a U.S. patent application must be ﬁled within one year of the oﬃcial publication date or public use of an
invention. To preserve international patent rights, the ﬁling of a U.S. patent application must precede public
disclosure of an invention. While in the process of securing patent rights in the invention, the OTT also
engages in a review of the invention’s commercial possibilities and develops a licensing approach. The OTT
formally advertises its inventions to potential licensees, actively promotes the technology to companies, and
ultimately negotiates on behalf of the government the terms of the license. Since the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980, the government has increased eﬀorts to transfer inventions to private industry for commercialization,
primarily through more frequent use of exclusive licensing.
Companies may obtain a license from the government to unpatented, patented or patent-pending material.
The license may be either “exclusive” or “nonexclusive.” Exclusive licenses limit the use of the invention to
a single entity. This entity retains the sole right to make, use and sell the invention. A nonexclusive license,
on the other hand, contemplates simultaneous use by multiple groups or entities. In deciding whether to
10Bayh-Dole, supra note 7, at 35 U.S.C. § 207.
9issue an exclusive or nonexclusive license, the OTT considers a variety of issues including, but not limited
to, whether an exclusive license serves the best interests of the public, whether practical application of the
invention will be achieved by a nonexclusive license, and whether an exclusive license is necessary to attract
necessary ﬁnancial investment. Applicants seeking an exclusive license are required to submit a business
development plan in addition to a detailed justiﬁcation of the aforementioned criteria. Notice of a proposed
exclusive license is published in the Federal Register. Public comments must be received within 60 days of
the publication. After consideration of these comments, a ﬁnal decision on the exclusive license is made.
The licensees are required to report at least annually on their utilization of the material. More importantly,
the license is revocable for a number of reasons, including non-use of the patent, failure to comply with
governing regulations or failure to satisfy public health needs.11 From 1996 through 1998, 84.7% (or 514) of
the licenses granted by NIH were nonexclusive.12
If the material is covered by a patent or patent application, two additional types of licenses are also avail-
able.13 A “Commercial Evaluation License” grants the nonexclusive right to make and use technology for the
purpose of evaluating its commercial potential. Under such a license, the company may not sell the product.
These licenses are limited to a short amount of time, after which the company seeking to continue use of the
material must obtain one of the other types of licenses. The ﬁnal type of license is called an “Internal Use”
license. This license allows for the right to make and use technology, but not the right to sell.
11See discussion infra page 30.
12United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Duncan L. Hunter, House of Repre-
sentatives, Technology Transfer, Number and Characteristics of Inventions Licensed by Six Federal Agencies
GAO/RCED-99-173 (June 1999) [hereinafter GAO Report To Hunter] at 7.
13Companies may obtain rights to biological materials not covered by a patent or patent application through a “Biological
Materials License.” These licenses allow the company to make, use and sell commercially useful biological materials, even if
patent protection for these materials will not be sought. As such, these licenses are typically nonexclusive.
10Congress has, in addition, passed legislation enabling private entities to collaborate with government
scientists on intramural research. The agreements that outline the contours of such research are called
“Collaborative Research and Development Agreements” (CRADAs). CRADAs are and were intended to be
ﬂexible agreements, adaptable to the varied laboratory developments that give rise to them. Once a CRADA
is entered into, the laboratory is obligated “to grant, or agree to grant in advance, to a collaborating party
patent licenses or assignments, or options thereto, in any invention made in whole or in part by a laboratory
employee under the agreement, for reasonable compensation when appropriate.”14 As with all inventions
discovered at least partially with taxpayer funding, the government retains certain rights to the invention.15
In 2000, the NIH disclosed 330 inventions, ﬁled 189 patent applications, issued 120 patents and executed
185 licenses. Also in 2000, the NIH executed 109 CRADAs, of which 34 were standard and 75 were mate-
rials.16 An impressive and lengthy list of the materials developed intramurally and currently available for
licensing can be found online at the OTT website.17 The list of available technologies is remarkable – on the
date that this was written, 213 technologies pertaining to cancer alone were available for licensing.
In general, the number of licenses executed each year by the government for government-owned inventions
has remained stable, while the royalties received for these inventions have increased.18 In 2000, the NIH
received $52 million in royalties. In the ﬁve years spanning from 1996 through 1999, inclusive, NIH received
licensing revenues totaling approximately $150 million.19 Though signiﬁcant, these ﬁgures must be kept in
perspective – they amount to only 1% of taxpayer spending on intramural research.
14Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311-2320 (codiﬁed as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (1994)), at15 U.S.C. §3710a(c)(5)(C) [hereinafter Stevenson-Wydler].
15For a review of current complications in the government’s use of CRADAs, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of
Technology Policy, Tech Transfer 2000: Making Partnerships Work (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Making Partnerships
Work].
16Oﬃce of Technology Transfer (visited July 3, 2001) <http://ott.od.nih.gov/>.
17See id. at <http://ott.od.nih.gov/db/tech.asp>.
18GAO Report To Hunter, supra note 12, at 4.
19NIH Response, supra note 5, at 6.
11Law provides that federal inventors must receive the ﬁrst $2,000 of income received by the agency and then
at least 15% thereafter, up to a maximum of $150,000 per year in royalties from each licensed technologies
that they invented.20 In 2000, 28 NIH inventors received the maximum $150,000 royalty.21 The remaining
income goes to the Institute or Center within which the licensed technology was originally developed. The
funds can be used for a variety of enumerated purposes that run consistent with the general mission of NIH.
I.B.3. Extramural Research
Extramural research is that conducted by non-federal employees supported by government grants. Ex-
tramural research may be conducted by institutions of higher education, research institutes and foundations,
and other nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt organizations. Under the terms of the Bayh-Dole Act, title in inventions
discovered through extramural research rests not with the government but with the grantee. The government
nevertheless retains certain rights to the invention: The government retains the right to use the invention on
or for its own behalf; the grantee is required to comply with certain reporting requirements; and, the govern-
ment retains the right to “march-in” on the license-holder’s property right if the license-holder has failed to
meet one of a number of enumerated standards. These rights are explored in detail in the following section
of the article. The NIH provides some guidance to grantees concerning their obligations under this complex
regulatory framework. An online service called “Interagency Edison” has been established to, among other
things, provide guidance on the reporting processes mandated by 37 C.F.R. § 401 (1995).22
The NIH spent roughly $17 billion, or 84%, of its 2001 budget on extramural research.23 Of this total,
20The NIH has adopted a policy under which inventors receive 25% of the income after $50,000 is attained, up to the statutory
maximum. NIH Response, supra note 5, at 6.
21Id.
22See <www.iedison.gov>.
23NIH Response, supra note 5, at 3.
12$11.8 billion were spent on Research Project Grants (RPGs).24 RPGs are the most common funding mecha-
nism at NIH. They are typically initiated by a researcher’s request for funding for a speciﬁc research inquiry.
The NIH generally commits to providing support for an average of four years.
The priorities driving NIH grants comport with the agency’s overall mission to “expand fundamental knowl-
edge about the nature and behavior of living systems, improve and develop new strategies for the diagnosis,
treatment, and prevention of disease, reduce the burdens of disease and disability, and assure a continuing
cadre of outstanding scientists for future advances.”25 More speciﬁcally, programming and management
decisions are based on several fundamental principles. It is worth quoting these principles at length:
•
“An obligation to respond to public health needs, as judged by the incidence, severity, and direct and indirect costs of speciﬁc diseases, disorders and disabilities. However, calculations of public health needs are complex and cannot be correlated with research spending in a simple manner. The challenge is particularly well illustrated by research spending for rare diseases, i.e., if funding decisions were based solely on disease prevalence, research on rare diseases would be unlikely to be supported by the NIH.
•
A responsibility to seize the scientiﬁc opportunities that oﬀer the best prospects for new knowledge and better health.
•
A commitment to support work of the highest scientiﬁc caliber.
•
Because we cannot know when major discoveries will occur and what opportunities they will create, it is essential that NIH maintain a diverse portfolio, including basic and clinical research involving diverse scientiﬁc disciplines and research on a wide range of diseases, disorders and disabilities.
•
An obligation to ensure a strong scientiﬁc infrastructure, with a high quality workforce and excellent research facilities.”26
24NIH Investments, supra note 8.
25Id.
13These priorities are set through a variety of mechanisms that take advantage of the technical and general
knowledge of both federal and non-federal scientists. Mechanisms for obtaining this input include review
groups, Institute or Center National Advisory Councils, conferences, workshops, ad hoc advisory groups, the
Advisory Committee to the Director, NIH, the NIH Director’s Council of Public Representatives, and the
results of the Government Performance and Results Act.27
I.C. History of Technology Transfer
The government’s approach to tech transfer is in a near constant state of ﬂux. Since World War II, when
the government recognized that its involvement in the wartime economy resulted in its holding a number
of signiﬁcant technologies, tech transfer has been the subject of steady review and debate. This section of
the article provides a brief overview of the historical developments leading to today’s approach to technology
transfer.28 Five themes emerge from this review of law and policy. First, transfers of taxpayer-funded assets
from the public sector to the private sector have been taking place on terms increasingly favorable to the
latter. (The debate over whether this is a positive or negative development is, for the moment, set aside.)
Second, I argue that this trend may be partially attributed to our legal regime’s embrace of strong property
rights and a sharp public-private distinction. Third, the foreign policy implications of how government-funded
inventions reach the marketplace have received alarmingly little attention. Fourth, just as the nature of R&D
is continually changing, so too is the policy of technology transfer. Fifth, tech transfer policy has succeeded
in stimulating the commercialization of an astounding number of new medications – the policy has, since the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, been widely regarded as a success.
I.C.1. The Legal Backdrop
27Id.
28For a more detailed historical review, see Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1671.
14The arguments that shape policy development exist within a legal framework that both deﬁnes the meaning
of terms and assigns these terms either positive or negative valences. For this reason, it is important to locate
within this legal regime two legal doctrine that have played signiﬁcant roles in shaping technology transfer
policy: property law and the public-private distinction. Current policy, it may be argued, is the predictable
result of a legal framework in which, ﬁrst, property law favors strong property entitlements, and, second, a
rigid public-private distinction clearly distinguishes entities that are public – the government – from those
that are private – universities, foundations, and industry.
I.C.1.a. Property Law
The American legal system has for a long time vested in property holders very strong property entitlements.
Indeed a fundamental tenet of 19th century property law was the premise that a property owner’s right to
use and enjoy property is absolute. Similarly strong entitlements have been granted to owners of intellectual
property. As previously mentioned, Congress provides an incentive to innovation by securing to investors
and inventors a patent – a property right – in their inventions.29 In accord with the legal regime’s general
disposition toward property rights, the rights of the patent holder are very strong. In the American system,
patents are limited in their duration, but, during their existence, not in their strength. A diﬀerent legal
regime, such as one that featured weaker property rights, might prefer an alternate approach. It may reach
the same result, namely, innovation, with a patent regime that features longer patent terms but, during the
term, weaker property rights. Or, a legal regime that disfavors property rights might reward inventors with
29The Constitution authorizes the Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art I, §8 cl 8.
15a lump-sum payment and then make the invention widely available for public consumption.
As will be discussed in detail, tech transfer proscribes a system where the government, universities and
industry retain certain rights to inventions produced in collaboration with each other. These rights are
typically set forth not in the background common law of property, but in contracts signed by participating
parties. The grant by the government of an exclusive license, for example, is a contract in which the
government retains certain rights to the property. Nevertheless, the following review of the policy’s history
reveals that many arguments put forward in the policy debate speak to the importance of strong property
rights. Thus even though the government retains rights to the transferred property through contract, industry
and universities allege that exercise of these contract rights threaten their own strong property rights in the
patented invention. Unless one is cognizant of the legal framework within which the policy is developing –
namely, a framework that has historically embraced strong property entitlements – it is diﬃcult to understand
why such arguments have been taken as seriously have they have been.
I.C.1.b. The Public-Private Distinction
Tech transfer policy has also been shaped by the American legal regime’s longstanding adherence to a rigid
public-private distinction. In the early 1800s, the law barely distinguished “public” entities from “private”
entities. There was, for example, no legal distinction between the incorporation of a for-proﬁt enterprise and
the incorporation of a city or municipality. Over the years, a very rigid distinction has, for legal purposes,
been elaborated. Indeed the distinction is black or white. Cities, of course, are considered “public;” for-proﬁt
entities are “private.” There is no gray area in between.
The implications that the rigid public-private distinction has on the development of technology transfer policy
16are twofold. First, the rigid distinction makes it virtually impossible for policy-makers to conceptualize
granting property rights to a single entity consisting of both public and private elements. Current policy
distinguishes public entities from private entities and then focuses on the “transfer” of the property from the
former to the latter. Were the public-private distinction less rigid, it might be possible for policy-makers to
instead construct a joint entity which combines “public” and “private” parts. (The CRADA, incidentally,
represents a small step in this direction.) Such a mixed entity might more accurately reﬂect the fact that
the R&D process is, in reality, a collaboration among entrepreneurs, investors, scientists, universities and
government employees. Its funding also comes from a full range of sources: government, universities, private
industry and foundations. As will be seen, the idea of vesting property rights in this type of joint entity is
never, the entire history of tech transfer policy, given serious consideration.
Second, the rigid public-private distinction leads us, for legal purposes, to think of this complex, collaborative
process as a simple “transfer” of an asset from public to private. Once the transfer has occurred and the
invention is thought to be in private hands, the private sector is then able to take advantage of the full
power, rhetorical and otherwise, of the legal regime’s preference for strong property rights. In this way, the
two legal doctrine work together to create a disconnect between what is actually happening and the legal
arguments that explain what is happening. In actuality, the R&D process is collaborative in nature and
both public and private entities possess rights, through contract, in the subject invention. In legal terms,
however, a property right is “transferred” from public to private hands. Any exercise of the public’s retained
rights to the property threatens to blur the rigid line between public and private. The exercise of these rights
also threatens the strong property rights of the private entity to whom the invention has been transferred.
Together, then, property law and the public-private distinction work in tandem to secure to private entities
a presumed strong entitlement to the property transferred to them.
17An interesting corollary is the landmark case of Lloyd Corp v. Tanner.30 Here the U.S. Supreme Court
grappled with the intersection of strong property rights and the public-private distinction, as well as the First
Amendment. At issue was whether leaﬂetters can exercise their First Amendment rights to expression at
a shopping mall. Adhering to the rigid public-private distinction, the Court held that the shopping mall is
“private” (despite the fact that the mall opens itself up to the general public and plays a role in society that,
arguably, resembles that of a public square). Thus, the Court held, the property owner could exercise his
strong property rights and exclude leaﬂetters just as he can exclude any trespasser. In other words, the Court
ﬁrst used the public-private distinction to clearly delineate that which is private from that which is public;
then, the Court found that that which is private is entitled to strong property rights. A similar result has
been obtained by the policy-makers who have, over the past 50 years, been responsible for the development of
tech transfer policy.
I.C.2. From World War II to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
During World War II, increased government outlays led to remarkable growth in the industrial capacity
of the United States. Anticipating that the government’s increased role in R&D would give rise to issues
concerning patents, ownership and commercialization, President Roosevelt created by executive order the
National Patent Planning Commission.31 The Commission analyzed the role that patents play in government-
funded research and, in a report issued in 1945, determined that a balance must be struck between, on the
one hand, keeping public inventions in the public domain, and, on the other, allowing for their private
ownership.32 According to commentator Rebecca Eisenberg, the primary concern of the Commission was
30Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
312 Subcommittee on Domestic and Int’l Scientiﬁc Planning and Analysis of the House Committee on Science and Technology,
94th Cong., Background Materials on Government Patent Policies: Reports of Committees, Commissions, and Major Studies
xi (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter Background Reports].
32National Patent Planning Commission, Government-Owned Patents and Inventions of Government Employees and Con-
18to ensure that the government itself protects its own ability to use taxpayer-funded inventions. Beyond
that, the Commission indicated a preference for the free and open use of government-funded inventions by
anyone. There was, thus, a presumption in favor of nonexclusive licensing. Exclusive licensing, by contrast,
was recommended only when necessary to induce private manufacturers to engage in further R&D and
commercialization.33 To this end, the Commission recommended that government agencies “issue exclusive
licenses in cases where it seems evident that otherwise the inventions in question will not come into general
use.”34
Agencies proceeded to take varied approaches to tech transfer activity. Some followed a “title” policy
that called for the government to retain title in its own inventions. This approach comports with the
philosophy that public inventions should remain in the public domain.35 Agencies taking this approach
included the Department of Agriculture36 and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).37
Other agencies took a “license” approach. Under this approach, which was advocated in a 1947 report by
the Attorney General,38 the government retains certain rights, including a license to use the invention on its
own behalf, but otherwise transfers title in the invention to the contractor. Most notably, this approach was
taken by the DoD.39
tractors, reprinted in Background Reports, supra note 31 (1945) [hereinafter Patent Planning Commission].
33Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1672.
34Patent Planning Commission, supra note 32, at 4-5.
35Despite their interest in developing the public domain, proponents of the title approach nevertheless favored the patenting
of government inventions by the government itself. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1675.
36Agriculture Research and Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. § 427i(a) (1994).
37James A. Dobkin, Patent Policy in Government Research and Development Contracts, 53. Va. L. Rev. 564 (1967) at 580.
38Attorney General of the United States, Investigation of Government Patent Practices and Policies: Report
and Recommendations of the Attorney General to the President, partially reprinted in Background Reports, supra
note 31, at 15 (1947).
39Dobkin, supra note 37, at 574.
19In the 1960s, the Kennedy administration continued to balance government retention of rights with incentives
for private development, while at the same time attempting to standardize the policy across government
agencies. A 1963 Presidential Memorandum and Policy Statement identiﬁed circumstances wherein the
government would retain title in the invention, but, at the same time, continued to allow heads of agencies
to grant at their discretion an exclusive license where necessary “to call forth private risk capital and
expense.”40 Agency heads acted upon this discretion to grant exclusive licenses only rarely – nonexclusive
licensing was the general rule.
The Presidential Memorandum notwithstanding, agencies continued to vary in their approaches to technology
transfer. In 1962, for example, the NIH began to require signiﬁcantly more of private industry than did other
agencies. Speciﬁcally, the NIH required private entities to sign an extensive agreement with the agency prior
to screening for biological activity compounds developed with NIH funds. The agreement restricted the
ability of ﬁrms to disclose the results of their testing, obligated the prompt reporting to the government
of results, restricted the ﬁrms’ rights to obtain patents on new uses, and retained for the government a
nonexclusive license.41 These stringent requirements dampened private interest in the development of public
inventions. The NIH policy did not change until 1968.42 After 1968, NIH policy enabled, among other things,
institutions of higher education to patent inventions discovered under government grants.43 The universities
could then sell exclusive rights to these patented products to private industry. Thus the university would
get royalties, but not the government. A strikingly similar policy was later to be adopted by Congress in
40Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (1963) at 10,944.
412 Harbridge House, Government Patent Policy Study, Final Report for the FCST Committee on Government Patent Policy
(1968) at 12-13 [hereinafter Harbridge House Report].
42Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress: Problem Areas Affecting Usefulness
of Results of Government-Sponsored Research in Medicinal Chemistry, reprinted in 1 Government Patent Policies:
Institutional Patent Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly and Anticompetitive Activities of the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Bus., 95th Cong. 373-98 (1978) at 109.
43Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1683.
20Bayh-Dole.
In 1965, the Federal Council for Science and Technology (FCST), a division of the executive branch, com-
missioned Harbridge House, a leading consulting ﬁrm with expertise in science and technology, to conduct a
study on the government’s patent policy.44 Published in 1968, the Harbridge House Report found that the
rate of commercial utilization of government inventions was low.45 Although many used this ﬁnding to argue
that greater use of exclusive licensing was necessary to commercialize government inventions, the Report
itself did not ﬁnd the evidence suﬃcient to resolve this debate. The Report stated that “the evidence does
not indicate that either title or nonexclusive licensing is uniformly the best way to promote utilization.”46
The Report did, however, note that exclusive licensing may be necessary “where the invention is commer-
cially oriented but requires substantial private development to perfect it, applies to a small market, or is
in a ﬁeld occupied by patent sensitive ﬁrms and its market potential is not alone suﬃcient to bring about
utilization.”47
In a 1971 Presidential Memorandum, the Nixon administration largely implemented the recommendations
of the Harbridge House Report.48 Eisenberg explains that the Memorandum “facilitated the allocation of
exclusive rights in government-sponsored inventions in a number of ways. They clariﬁed the authority of
government agencies to grant greater rights than a nonexclusive license....They allowed agencies to revoke
nonexclusive licenses held by contractors in order to grant exclusive licenses where necessary to encourage
44Harbridge House Report, supra note 41, at ii.
45Speciﬁcally, the Report found that only 12.4% of a sample of government-sponsored inventions that were patented in the
years 1957 and 1962 had actually been put to use. See id., at 3-4.
46Id.
47See id., at vii.
48Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (1971).
21commercialization of the invention. Finally, they explicitly authorized exclusive licenses under government-
owned patents.”49
Thus from WWII to the 1970s, technology transfer slowly shifted toward greater use of exclusive licenses.
This meant that the executive branch had been transferring government-funded inventions to private entities
on terms increasingly favorable to the latter, largely without congressional approval or oversight. The exec-
utive branch’s policy involved transfers of assets worth millions of dollars, including assets such as essential
medicines and military technology. Such transfers, it was increasingly believed, required congressional ap-
proval, and interest in congressional action began to grow. Several lawsuits were brought in the early 1970s
challenging the constitutional authority of the executive branch to transfer taxpayer-funded inventions with-
out express statutory authorization.50
Calls for congressional action were also coming from universities, private industry and even the executive
branch itself. After years of adjusting to new administrations and new heads of agencies, universities and
private industry sought some measure of policy stability. The NIH, for example, threatened in 1978 to
return to the stricter policies of the 1960s. And then, in 1979, President Carter voiced support for more
extensive exclusive licensing as part of his plan to invigorate industrial productivity.51 At this time, there
existed a growing sentiment that the United States had lost its position as the global leader in technological
innovation. Japan in particular was mounting a vigorous campaign to claim the technology throne. An
address on the topic that President Carter made to Congress provided the impetus for congressional action.
49Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1685.
50The courts never reached decisions on the merits, as these lawsuits were dismissed for lack of standing. Public Citizen v.
Sampson, 180 U.S.PQ. (BNA) 497 (D.D.C. 1974); Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974).
51Industrial Innovation Initiatives: Message to Congress on Administration Actions and Proposals, Pub. Papers 2070, 2071
(Oct. 31, 1979). Carter’s address was largely based on the ﬁndings of the Domestic Policy Review Final Report. Advisory
Committee on Industrial Innovation, Industrial Advisory Subcommittee on Patent and Information Policy, Report on Patent
Policy (1979), reprinted in Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation: Final Report (1979).
22This action, which came to be known as the Bayh-Dole Act, placed a congressional stamp of approval on the
direction in which technology transfer policy had been moving, namely, increased use of exclusive licenses.
I.C.3. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
The Bayh-Dole Act of 198052 is widely credited with having ushered in the modern era of technology transfer
policy. The Act signaled broad congressional approval of exclusive licensing, with several taxpayer protections
built into the bill to protect against abuse of these licenses. Commentators have described its impact as
marking a “sea change” in the policy.53 Exclusive licenses had been rare under Kennedy, and still quite rare
under Nixon. Now, agencies had a congressional green light to more aggressively pursue exclusive licensing
where necessary to induce commercialization.
Congress actually passed two signiﬁcant pieces of legislation in 1980 pertaining to technology transfer.
The Bayh-Dole Act concerns itself with extramural R&D. Extramural R&D is that conducted by private
institutions (such as universities, foundations and for-proﬁt companies) using government funding. The
Stevenson-Wydler Act, on the other hand, concerns itself with intramural research, or, research conducted
by federal scientists in state-owned labs.54 I will ﬁrst discuss Bayh-Dole.
The objectives of Bayh-Dole indicate that Congress intended to grapple with the same issues that had been
driving technology transfer policy since World War II, namely, how to balance the value of keeping publicly-
funded inventions in the public domain with the need to grant exclusive licenses to induce commercialization.
52Bayh-Dole, supra note 7.
53Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1663. The Act has also been referred to as a “major departure” from existing agency practice.
Arno & Davis, supra note 3, at 646.
54Stevenson-Wydler, supra note 14.
23The objectives of the Act are:
to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from fed-
erally supported research or development; to encourage maximum participation of small
business ﬁrms in federally supported research and development eﬀorts; to promote collabo-
ration between commercial concerns and nonproﬁt organizations, including universities; to
ensure that inventions made by nonproﬁt organizations and small business ﬁrms are used
in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise; to promote the commercialization
and public availability of inventions made in the United States by United States industry
and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains suﬃcient rights in federally supported
inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or
unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this
area. 35 U.S.C. § 200.
Curiously absent from this description of the Act’s purpose is mention of a major issue weighing heavily on
the minds of legislators – ensuring that American business remained on par or ahead of foreign competi-
tion. At this time, Japan had surpassed Silicon Valley as the world’s leader in superconductor design and
manufacturing. There was grave concern that America had lost its technological superiority. Senator Birch
Bayh, for example, opened a Senate hearing on the Act by stating that he had “become very concerned
that the United States is rapidly losing its preeminent position in the development and production of new
technologies.”55 He goes on to note that “importation of foreign manufactured goods are second only to
foreign imported oil as the biggest drain on U.S. dollars.”56 Senator Bob Dole stated that the purpose of the
Act was to ensure that the U.S. government played a more direct role in stimulating technological advance:
“The development of technological innovation by government and industry in countries such as Japan and
Germany is a contributing factor in their dominance of world trade.”57 Though absent from the Act’s ﬁnal
language, it is clear that a central purpose of the legislature was to stimulate R&D.
55The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, on S. 414, 96th Cong., 96-11 (May 16, and June 6, 1979) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] at 1 (opening statement of
Senator Birch Bayh).
56Id.
57See Id., at 28 (opening statement of Senator Bob Dole)
24Bayh-Dole promotes the use of exclusive licensing to ensure commercialization of taxpayer-funded inventions.
Small businesses and universities using federal funding are entitled under the Act to retain title to inventions.
A university can, in turn, license that invention to businesses, large or small, interested in commercializing
the product. In exchange for an exclusive license to the invention, universities receive up-front payments
and/or royalties.
Although the Act enables title to vest in small businesses conducting R&D with government funds, it is silent
as to whether title can vest in large businesses. Fearing that voters would view such a policy as a handout
to big business, legislators determined that inclusion of big business in the Act was a political liability. An
amendment to include large businesses failed in the Senate by a vote of 60-34.58 Big business had lobbied
vigorously for their inclusion in the bill, and many felt that their exclusion might cause agencies that had
previously allowed title to vest in big business to change their policy. This fear was not to be realized, as
agencies continued their existing practice of allowing large businesses to retain title to inventions. These
agency practices received express approval when, by executive order, President Ronald Reagan extended the
provisions of Bayh-Dole to big business in 1983.59
A signiﬁcant number of legislators were concerned that the exclusive licenses might be abused. Thus three
types of provisions designed to protect taxpayers from such abuses were ultimately included in the Act.
First, the government retained for itself the right to use the invention for or on its own behalf.60 Second, the
grantee is required to comply with reporting procedures. These call for the grantee to notify the government
58Letter from Sen. Gaylord Nelson, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Small Bus., to Rep. Robert w. Kastenmeier,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (June 9,
1980), reprinted in Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 6933 [mislabeled as
6033], H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806, H.R. 2414 (The President’s Industrial Innovation Program) before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Amdin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 286(1980) [hereinafter House
Hearings] at 877-78
59Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Government Patent Policy, Pub. Papers 248 (Feb.
18, 1983). Similar policy was given further Presidential approval through an Executive Order signed in 1987. Exec. Order No.
12,591, 52 C.F.R. 13414 (1987).
60Bayh-Dole, supra note 7, at 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(b).
25of any invention within two months of disclosure to the grantee’s employees.61 Then, the grantee must again
notify the agency within two years as to whether it wishes to exercise its title to the invention.62 Should the
grantee fail to meet these reporting deadlines, the government may, upon submission of a written request to
the grantee, assert its own title to the invention.63 Importantly, the Act further requires that a legend be
placed on both the patent application and any resulting patent that identiﬁes the invention as a product of
taxpayer dollars.64
The third taxpayer protection included in Bayh-Dole is the government’s retained “march-in rights.” These
provisions entitle a funding agency to issue nonexclusive licenses or to require a contractee or exclusive
licensee to grant nonexclusive licenses to other applicants if the agency determines that:
“(1) Such action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not
expected to take within a reasonable time, eﬀective steps to achieve practical application of
the subject invention in such ﬁeld of use;
(2) Such action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably
satisﬁed by the contractor, assignee or their licensees;
(3) Such action is necessary to meet requirements for public use speciﬁed by Federal reg-
ulations and such requirements are not reasonably satisﬁed by the contractor, assignee or
licensees; or
(4) Such action is necessary because the agreement required by paragraph (i) of this clause
has not been obtained or waived or because a licensee of the exclusive right to use or sell
any subject invention in the United States is in breach of such agreement.” 37 C.F.R. §
401.14(j) (emphasis added).
The term practical application is deﬁned as:
61Bayh-Dole, supra note 7, at 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)(1).
62Bayh-Dole, supra note 7, at 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)(2).
63Bayh-Dole, supra note 7, at 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(d).
64Bayh-Dole, supra note 7, at 37 CFR 401.14(c)(3).
26“to manufacture in the case of a composition or product, to practice in the case of a process
or method, or to operate in the case of a machine or system; and, in each case, under such
conditions as to establish that the invention is being utilized and that its beneﬁts are, to the
extent permitted by law or government regulations, available to the public on reasonable
terms.” 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a)(3) (emphasis added).
The march-in rights were intended to prevent two outcomes: First, where a private entity sits on a taxpayer-
funded invention and fails to commercialize it in a timely fashion; and, second, where a private entity takes
advantage of the exclusive license and charges an unreasonable price for the product. Although no speciﬁc
formula was put forward to calculate what constitutes an unreasonable price and proﬁt, it is fair to say that
the march-in provisions were intended to protect against corporate windfalls. Of course, the Act certainly
contemplated some return on investment, for such a return is necessary to induce commercialization.
The eﬀectiveness of these three taxpayer protections has been and continues to be the subject of heated
debate. It has been argued that the government rarely uses a product on its own behalf; that the reporting
requirements are ineﬀective; and, that the march-in provisions have never been utilized. A comprehensive
analysis of these concerns is presented in Section II.
In 1980, Congress also passed the Stevenson-Wydler Act.65 Whereas Bayh-Dole addresses extramural re-
search, Stevenson-Wydler addresses intramural research. The legislation enables and encourages government
agencies to execute exclusive licenses with private actors to encourage commercialization of inventions. The
Act provides a ﬁnancial return to taxpayers primarily in the form of royalty payments, which go to both the
individual inventor as well as the funding agency. In 1986, the Stevenson-Wydler approach to intramural
development was augmented by the Federal Technology Transfer Act, which authorized federal researchers
to collaborate with private actors through the use of CRADAs.
65Stevenson-Wydler, supra note 14.
27I.C.4. Perspectives on Policy Developments
Five signiﬁcant themes emerge from even this brief overview of the history of tech transfer. The ﬁrst is that
there has been a trend over time to transfer taxpayer assets from public to private hands on terms increasingly
favorable to the latter. Early debates over whether to use exclusive licenses have all but disappeared. Their
use is now widely accepted, and instead policy-makers debate how to build taxpayer protections into the
background rights of such licenses. (As will be seen in Section II, the debate over these taxpayer protections
can be intense.)
Second, technology transfer policy has been inﬂuenced by the legal regime in which it has developed. Specif-
ically, the rigid public-private distinction clearly distinguishes public entities from private entities and leads
policy-makers to place the drug, at any one time, in the hands of either one or the other. Then, the entity
in possession of the drug can take advantage of the legal regime’s preference for strong property rights. The
result is a policy that resembles a relay race. Government – the public – runs the ﬁrst leg when it engages
in basic, foundational research. Industry – the private – runs the second leg when it conducts clinical trials
and achieves commercialization. Tech transfer policy exists to ensure that the baton, the drug, is cleanly
transferred from the public to the private. When industry runs the second leg, it alone has possession of the
baton (and can therefore take advantage of the legal regime’s preference for strong property rights). During
the second leg, exercise by the government of its retained rights to the baton would appear to violate the rules
of the race. However, the relay race conceptualization of the drug development process is an oversimpliﬁca-
tion. Scientists work together, funds are co-mingled and intellectual property rights are granted by, retained
by, and enforced by the government. Policy-makers should not let the legal regime’s posture toward property
rights and the public-private distinction oversimplify, for legal purposes, what is in reality a complex and
collaborative process.
28The third interesting element of policy development is what is absent: adequate consideration of its inter-
national, foreign policy implications. The legislators who passed Bayh-Dole were concerned about foreign
competition – they wished to ensure that America reemerged as the global leader in technology. Tech trans-
fer, however, aﬀects not only international competition but also international equity and global security.
The U.S. government plays a formative role in the development of critical pharmaceutical medications and
dangerously eﬀective pieces of military equipment, yet, American citizens have little to no control over how
these inventions enter the international marketplace. For example, American citizens helped to develop Zerit,
an eﬀective AIDS medication. In the face of a growing AIDS epidemic in Africa, private industry, the second
runner in the relay race, priced this medication out of the reach of African patients. Regardless of whether
this price is justiﬁable and regardless of whether U.S. citizens had any say in the pricing strategy, the latter
are held accountable, in the international arena, for how their inventions entered the marketplace. When
African AIDS patients and their families discover the role that U.S. citizens played in the development of
a medication to which they were eﬀectively denied access, what attitudes toward America might we expect
them to harbor?66
Fourth, one must not let the signiﬁcant impact of Bayh-Dole obscure the fact that technology transfer policy
is ﬂexible and evolutional in character. Just as the nature of R&D changes over time, so too will the
nature of tech transfer. The legislature may step in from time to time (as it did in 1980), but many of
the changes in policy have been and will continue to be made piecemeal by the executive branch. Despite
progress toward greater standardization across agencies, agencies continue to wield a signiﬁcant amount of
discretion over the terms of asset transfers. A recent government report highlights this notion, ﬁnding as one
of its “major insights” the fact that “generic procedures for partnering and licensing provided by the federal
66This issue recently emerged at the WTO negotiations in Doha, Qatar, when poorer countries demanded ﬂexibility in the
international patent regime to respond to health crises. The negotiations did not distinguish products developed entirely with
private investment from those partially funded by public. See discussion infra page 87.
29laws have taken on diﬀerent shapes as they have been integrated into the distinctive research missions of the
agencies.”67 Whether to exercise march-in rights, for example, is an important decision that is made at the
agency level.
Fifth, and ﬁnally, the technology transfer regime proscribed by Bayh-Dole is now widely regarded as a
success. The security aﬀorded by exclusive licenses has encouraged private industry to invest in government-
funded technologies and risk bringing them to the market. And to the market they have come – doctors now
have a much wider array of medicines and equipment to choose from, enabling patients to lead longer and
healthier lives. The forces driving this explosion in health care technology are numerous, but among them,
many believe, is technology transfer. Even critics of tech transfer concede that Bayh-Dole has succeeded in
giving business adequate incentive to commercialize government-funded inventions. As will be seen in the
following section, their concern is rather that the policy has gone too far.
II.
Current Policy Debates
The Bayh-Dole regime is widely regarded as a success. This section begins with a presentation of the argu-
ments supporting this conclusion. These arguments then form the backdrop against which the three most
signiﬁcant critiques of current policy are measured. The three questions currently raised by critics of tech
transfer policy can be categorized as follows: Are exclusive licenses absolutely necessary to ensure com-
mercialization of government-funded inventions? Are taxpayers maximizing the return on their investment
67Making Partnerships Work, supra note 15, at 5.
30in R&D? And, is the policy facilitating R&D with the greatest potential to maximize human health and
welfare? The section concludes with several perspectives on these current debates. I argue, among other
things, that a lack of information is hampering the eﬀective resolution of all three issues.
II.A. The Success of the Bayh-Dole Regime
Since 1980, the number of medicines and health care technologies reaching the marketplace has skyrocketed.
University scientists are increasingly focused on the potential commercial applications of their research.
Hundreds of biotech ﬁrms are now busily conducting clinical tests on government-funded inventions, whereas
thirty years ago virtually no such small biotech ﬁrm existed. This activity means that doctors now have a
much wider array of medicines and equipment to choose from, enabling patients to live longer and healthier
lives. PhRMA calls the recent advances in medicine “unprecedented” and “nothing short of remarkable.”68
Among the many forces driving this progress is the Bayh-Dole regime of technology transfer.69 The regime
encouraged the use of exclusive licenses to government-funded inventions, providing private industry with
the security and ﬁnancial incentive necessary to invest in the risky and expensive drug development process.
The Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, an independent research organization wholly funded
by pharmaceutical companies, announced in November 2001 that the cost of developing a pharmaceutical
medication is $802 million.70 This ﬁgure represents the total cost of developing a new drug, including basic,
68Why Drugs Cost So Much, supra note 4.
69Other signiﬁcant forces driving the explosion in biomedical technology are the insights and technical capacity generated
by recent scientiﬁc breakthroughs. Among these breakthroughs is the ability to replicate compounds that, until recently, could
only be produced through natural processes.
70Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development Pegs
Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802 Million (Nov. 2001). This report follows the same method and uses the
same assumptions as a report that the Tufts Center released in 1991 pegging the cost at $231 million (in 1987 dollars). Had
the costs kept pace with inﬂation, the new cost would have been $318 million (in 2000 dollars). The Tufts Center attributes
the signiﬁcant rise in costs to the increased cost of conducting clinical trials. The Tufts Center receives 65% of its budget
in donations from pharmaceutical companies. The remaining 35% consists of revenues collected largely from pharmaceutical
companies in exchange for copies of the Center’s reports and publications.
31foundational research, clinical testing, and the approval process. As previously discussed, the government
tends to pay for the early stages of drug development, private industry the later. The study’s methodology
was thoroughly analyzed and largely corroborated by a government study.71
The Tufts Center ﬁgure incorporates three elements: “out-of-pocket expenditures” account for 10% of the
cost, “risk” accounts for 20-25%, and “opportunity cost of capital” accounts for roughly 65%. “Out-of-
pocket expenditures” cover preclinical research, clinical testing and the regulatory ﬁlings necessary for FDA
approval. “Risk” accounts for the fact that signiﬁcant amounts of money are spent on drugs that ultimately
fail. According to PhRMA, 99.9% of tested drugs never even begin clinical trials, and only 20% of drugs that
begin clinical testing emerge as commercially-viable, FDA-approved pharmaceuticals.72“Opportunity cost of
capital” accounts for the fact that drugs take a long time to develop, and, during that time, the corporation
could have invested in other projects.
Because the FDA has come to require increasingly stringent clinical testing, out-of-pocket expenditures,
risk and opportunity cost of capital have each escalated. Perhaps when the approval requirements were
looser, industry might have commercialized a government-funded invention with only a nonexclusive license.
But, such is not the case today. Today, absent the security of an exclusive license, industry simply would
not risk their capital commercializing a government-funded invention. Conventional wisdom maintains that
Bayh-Dole, in securing to industry the exclusive licenses necessary to incentivize commercialization, helped
to stimulate the explosion in biomedical progress that now brings greater health beneﬁts to everyone.
71Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks and Rewards, OTA-H-522 (1993). Roughly
half of the $802 million ﬁgure is the so-called opportunity cost of capital – the proﬁt that industry could return were they to
expend their money on other projects. This ﬁgure incorporates the costs expended on the many drugs that fail to emerge from
either initial testing or clinical testing.
72Raquel Pontes de Campos, AIDS: The great divide. Dispute over generic drugs pits the world’s haves against have-nots,
The Seattle Times, June 13, 2001, at A3.
32II.B. Three Current Questions
Although Bayh-Dole is widely heralded as a success, the policy is not without critics. Current controversies
over tech transfer can be categorized into three questions.
II.B.1. Are Exclusive Licenses Necessary to Ensure the Commercialization of Government-Funded
Inventions?
One challenge to the conventional wisdom regarding Bayh-Dole comes from those who question whether
exclusive licenses are in fact necessary to incentivize commercialization of government-funded inventions.
These individuals concede that exclusive licenses stimulate commercialization of government-funded inven-
tions. Nevertheless, these advocates contend that it may be possible to achieve commercialization without
going so far as to provide an exclusive license.
Proponents of exclusive licensing defend the practice by pointing not only to the successful record of com-
mercialization in the post-Bayh-Dole era, but also the unsuccessful record of the pre-Bayh-Dole era. In the
1970s, industry argued that government-funded inventions were languishing in government labs. These ar-
guments helped to convince legislators that expanded use of exclusive licensing was necessary to incentivize
commercialization. In a hearing on the Bayh-Dole Act, Senator Bayh remarked that “agencies have had very
little success attracting private industry to develop and market these inventions because when the agencies
retain the patent rights there is little incentive for any company to undertake the risk and expense of trying
to develop a new product.”73 Proponents of this view believed that nothing short of exclusive licensing
was necessary to keep government-funded inventions from being left on the laboratory ﬂoor. This view was
ultimately reﬂected in the provisions of Bayh-Dole.
73Senate Hearings, supra note 55, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Birch Bayh).
33Professor Rebecca Eisenberg, however, has questioned the key statistic often cited by both industry and
legislators in the discussions preceding Bayh-Dole. The statistic, cited here by Senator Dole, was that
“of the 28,000 patented inventions partially funded by the Government, only about ﬁve percent have been
used.”74 First, Eisenberg notes that the patents referred to by Senator Dole were largely the product of
grants from the DoD. Indeed 63% of these patents came from the DoD, and, of these patents, a mere 1% had
been commercialized. Under the terms of these DoD patents, Eisenberg notes, contractors could have, had
they wanted to, chosen to retain title. Their failure to do so indicates that these inventions, despite being
patented, were of little commercial value.75 Eisenberg further notes that only 325 of the 28,000 patents
were from the HEW (now the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)). Of these, 75 (23%) were
licensed as of the end of ﬁscal year 1976.76 Finally, Eisenberg argues that “the number of patent licenses
may be a misleading measure of utilization of inventions in that it overlooks both unlicensed development
of patented inventions and development or commercial utilization of unpatented inventions.”77 According
to the Harbridge House study, these practices were “common knowledge.”78 For these reasons Eisenberg
maintains that the record of commercialization in the pre-Bayh-Dole era may not have been as poor as many
contend.
Aside from the statistic cited by Senator Dole and challenged by Eisenberg, there are two additional pieces
of evidence that may reveal whether exclusive licenses provide a necessary incentive. First, there is evidence
that the stringent HEW policies of the 1960s had a chilling impact on public-private collaboration. As
74See id., at 28 (opening statement of Senator Robert Dole).
75Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1702.
76See id., at 1703.
77Id.
78Harbridge House Report, supra note 41, at 7.
34previously noted, the agency imposed strict reporting requirements on private entities interested in obtaining
rights to government inventions, and also reserved for the government a nonexclusive license to the product.
Proponents of exclusive licensing allege that public-private collaboration ground to a halt during this period
primarily because of the nonexclusive licensing provision. However, despite these claims, nobody has been
able to cite to a speciﬁc invention that failed to make it to the market in a timely fashion during this period.
Moreover, some university and government scientists have stated that, at that time, industry was willing to
commercialize products despite having only a nonexclusive license.79 (The rising cost of clinical trials may
mean that industry would be unwilling to do the same today.)
Second, in 1989, the NIH adopted a policy in CRADA negotiations that there should be “a reasonable
relationship between the pricing of a licensed product, the public investment in that product, and the health
and safety needs of the public.”80 The NIH reports that this reasonable-pricing clause led many companies
to withdraw from collaboration, and that the policy resulted in a “relatively ﬂat growth rate” of CRADAs
between 1990 and 1994.81 If a reasonable pricing clause eliminated industry’s incentive to collaborate, then
certainly, it may be argued, would a policy of nonexclusive licensing. However, contrary to the assertion
of the NIH, the Oﬃce of Technology Policy (OTP) has reported that the reasonable pricing clause did
not chill industry collaboration. Indeed the OTP trumpets the growth rate of CRADAs during the 1990s,
reporting that the number of active CRADA projects with HHS grew steadily throughout the 1990s, from
110 in 1990, to 147 in 1994, to 163 in 1998.82 The reasonable-pricing clause may have made investment in
government-funded inventions less attractive to private industry; but, it was still attractive enough.
79Interview with Dr. William Prusoﬀ, Professor Emeritus, Yale University School of Medicine, in New Haven, Ct. (Jan.
17, 2002); Telephone Interview with Dr. Marc Kirshner, Chairman, Department of Cell Biology, Harvard University School of
Medicine, (Feb. 7, 2002).
80NIH Response, supra note 5, at 9.
81Id.
82Making Partnerships Work, supra note 15, at p 92.
35To summarize, the debate over whether exclusive licenses are necessary to incentivize commercialization
continues to exist, though it is much less controversial than it once was. Bayh-Dole placed a heavy thumb on
the scale in favor of exclusive licensing, and its success has, for the most part, quieted calls for a return to the
days of nonexclusive licenses. Nevertheless, there remain commentators who argue that the pre-Bayh-Dole
years may not have been as bad as proponents of exclusive licensing contend.
II.B.2. Are Taxpayers Maximizing the Return on Their Investment?
A second issue raised by critics of technology transfer policy is whether taxpayers are maximizing the
return on their investment in biomedical R&D. Everyone agrees that inventions must be commercialized
– they should not be left to languish in government labs. Everyone also seems to agree that they should
be commercialized on terms as favorable to taxpayers as possible. This mission is reﬂected in the terms of
Bayh-Dole, which calls for agencies to transfer inventions on terms “not greater than reasonably necessary to
provide the incentive” to commercialize.83 Numerous commentators, while conceding that exclusive licenses
may be necessary to ensure commercialization, nevertheless contend that more should be done to protect
the taxpayer investment from abuses of these licenses.
Taxpayer returns come in many forms. First, commercialization enables consumers to access inventions. This
is perhaps the most important return, for it directly leads to greater health. Second, sales of commercialized
inventions generate tax revenue. Third, scientiﬁc progress helps drive economic growth. One government
report ﬁnds that the beneﬁt of increased life expectancy creates annual net gains of about $2.4 trillion (in
83Bayh-Dole, supra note 7, at 35 U.S.C. §209(c)(1)(A)-(D).
361992 dollars). Even if only 10% ($240 billion) of this total is attributable to government funding, taxpayers
are receiving a remarkable rate of return on the annual NIH investment of $16 billion.84
Furthermore, taxpayers can maximize the return on their investment by ensuring for themselves a price for
the medication no higher than that necessary to ensure commercialization. Industry skeptics have long been
concerned that exclusive licenses might enable industry to earn a proﬁt in excess of that which was necessary
to have incentivized commercialization in the ﬁrst place. Some of these excess proﬁts might be funneled
back into R&D; the rest, however, would go to shareholders. This is the so-called corporate windfall, the
windfall that Bayh-Dole was designed to prevent. In a Senate hearing, for example, Senator Bayh noted
that “criticism comes from those that feel that this bill is a front to allow the large, wealthy corporation to
take advantage of Government research dollars and thus to proﬁt at the taxpayers’ expense. We thought we
had drafted this bill in such a way that this was not possible.”85
Legislators built three forms of taxpayer protections into the Bayh-Dole regime of tech transfer. First, the
government retains a right to use government-funded inventions “on and for its own behalf.” Second, private
entities taking advantage of government funding must comply with reporting requirements. And, third, the
government retains the right to “march-in” on a patent if it is not being made available to the public on
reasonable terms. (Provisions pertaining to a fourth protection – royalty payments – were dropped at the
last moment.) Critics of current policy argue that even if these three taxpayer protections sound like enough
on paper, they have failed to protect taxpayers in practice.
First, the government seldom uses licenses on and for its own behalf.86 Signiﬁcantly, the government has
84The U.S. Congressional Joint Economic Committee (JEC), The Benefits of Medical Research and the Role of
NIH (May 2000), quoted in NIH Response, supra note 5, at 10.
85Senate Hearings, supra note 55, at 44 (during Senator Bayh’s questioning of Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the
United States).
86Making Partnerships Work, supra note 15, at 24. See also Government Accounting Office, Technology Transfer:
Reporting Requirements for Federally Sponsored Inventions Need Revision GAO/RCED-99-242 (Aug. 12, 1999)
37never attempted to use this provision to produce its own drugs, at cost, for Medicare.87 Second, it is now
widely recognized that reporting requirements fail to adequately protect the taxpayers’ investment. The
government does not know, for example, whether a speciﬁc NIH grant gave rise to a patented invention – no
database links grant information to patent information. Or, consider the following fundamental questions:
Of all of the new drugs approved by the FDA in 2001, how many were developed at least partially with
government funds? Which ones? Surprisingly, these two questions can be neither quickly nor easily answered.
One must locate the actual patents on the commercialized drugs and then search for the legend, mandated
by Bayh-Dole, that labels the invention as a product of government funding. Even if such a label is found,
the researcher will still have no way to track the size of the taxpayer investment (again because there is no
database linking grant information to patent information).
More troubling, however, is the fact that the legend mandated by Bayh-Dole is often missing altogether.
Bayh-Dole requires that any invention discovered with any amount of government funding include a label
that recognizes the government’s contribution. A review of medically related patents issued in 1997 found
that 143 of a total 633 patents did not include such a label, signaling that these 143 inventions were discovered
without any government funding at all. Alarmingly, grantees later conceded that 79 of these 143 inventions
were in fact the product of government funding.88 Arno and Davis write that “the failure to include a
legend is a kind of insurance against discovery and, without mincing words, amounts to theft of government
property and ongoing fraud of massive proportions.”89
Government oﬃcials have recognized and are responding to the fact that current reporting requirements are
insuﬃcient and under-enforced. In 1999, the GAO discovered, to its dismay, that “agencies generally did not
[hereinafter GAO Report on Reporting Requirements].
87Arno & Davis, supra note 3, at 691.
88See id. at 678.
89Id.
38collect or maintain information on licenses granted to third parties by contractors and grantees.”90 Then, in
2001, the NIH found that “information relating to inventive discoveries and their commercial development is
reported neither systematically nor consistently.”91 The NIH now proposes to address this deﬁciency by a)
requiring contractors to report to the agency the name and trademark of the commercialized invention, b)
linking this information to grant data and making this information available on the Internet, c) standardizing
and simplifying the reporting requirements, and d) imposing similar requirements on intramural research.
These recommendations condemn existing practices as inadequate to protect taxpayers, and, at the same
time, embody a promising step in the right direction.
The third taxpayer protection built into Bayh-Dole – the “march-in” provisions – has arguably been even less
eﬀective than the reporting requirements. Since the Act was passed in 1980, the march-in provisions have
never been exercised and only rarely even been considered. As previously discussed, march-in provisions
enable funding agencies to step in when the recipient of a previously-issued exclusive license is not achieving
“practical application” of the subject matter invention. “Practical application” means making the subject
invention available on “reasonable terms.” There are three other speciﬁc conditions that can also trigger
the exercise of march-in rights, including whether their exercise is necessary to “alleviate health and safety
needs.”92
It is clear from both its language and legislative history that the purpose of the march-in provision is
twofold. First, it is designed to prevent private entities from sitting on exclusive licenses obtained from the
government. For any of a number of reasons – ﬁnancial, strategic or otherwise – the possibility exists that
a private entity might obtain a license to a commercially-viable invention and then fail to act on it. If a
90GAO Report on Reporting Requirements, supra note 86, at 15.
91NIH Response, supra note 5, at 14.
92Bayh-Dole, supra note 7, at 37 C.F.R. § 401.14.
39signiﬁcant period of time elapses, the government can “march-in” on the license by issuing another license,
exclusive or otherwise, to a separate private entity.
The second purpose of the march-in provision is to prevent corporate windfalls. Inventions subsidized at least
in part by taxpayers are, according to the express terms of Bayh-Dole, to be made available on “reasonable
terms.” It is well-settled legal doctrine that statutes are, whenever possible, to be accorded their ordinary
and plain meaning.93 The ordinary meaning of “reasonable terms” incorporates reasonable price. This is
supported both in parallel circumstances and in the Act’s legislative history.94 In the context of anti-trust,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that in establishing “reasonable terms,” the
setting of “price should be a substantial factor.”95 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit interpreted a statute allowing the Federal Power Commission to establish “reasonable terms”
to mean that the “price...must be reasonable.”96 The same result is reached in a number of other situations
in which the ordinary meaning of “reasonable terms” was explored, and, it was concluded, deemed to include
price.97
That the legislators who drafted Bayh-Dole intended to give “reasonable terms” its ordinary meaning is well
established in the legislative history. As Arno and Davis have documented, the issue of windfall proﬁts was
foremost on the minds of legislators and industry alike. Industry fought to remove the march-in provisions
from the ﬁnal version of the bill. One industry witness testiﬁed that march-in rights are a “disincentive” that
should be “deleted.”98 Attempts to water down the meaning of “reasonable terms” failed,99 as legislators
93Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 232 (1993); Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991).
94Commentators Peter Arno and Michael Davis have explored this issue at length. Arno & Davis, supra note 3, at 646.
95Byers v. Bluﬀ City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 864 n.58 (6th Cir. 1979).
96American Liberty Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 301 F.2d 15, 18 (5th Cir. 1962).
97U.S. v. Mississippi Vocational Rehabilitation for the Blind, 812 F. Supp. 85, 87-89 (S.D. Miss. 1992); U.S. v. United States
Gypsum Co., 67 F. Supp. 397, 433-441 (D.D.C. 1946).
98Arno & Davis, supra note 3, at 661 (testimony of Robert B. Benson, Dir., Patent Department, Allis-Chalmers Corp.).
99Peter McCloskey, President of the Electronic Industry Association, suggested that the deﬁnition of “practical application”
be changed to allow for either “reasonable terms” or “reasonable licensing.” Arno & Davis, supra note 3, at 666.
40recognized that the march-in provision was the only provision of the bill with teeth to prevent corporate
windfalls. At the same time, legislators recognized that march-in rights would be exercised only rarely.
Even their infrequent use would be enough to ensure that industry can earn a nice proﬁt but cannot gouge
consumers and taxpayers. Infrequent, however, does not mean never.
Since the passage of Bayh-Dole, no funding agency has ever commenced march-in proceedings on its own
initiative, though the NIH considered doing so in the case of Taxol. Only once has a third party petitioned
the NIH to exercise march-in rights. This petition was primarily concerned with the alleviation of health and
safety needs and the timeliness of achieving practical application.100 In the discussion pertaining to whether
the contractee had achieved “practical application” on “reasonable terms,” Dr. Harold Varmus, Director of
the NIH, did not expressly consider whether price was a relevant factor.
Believing that the taxpayer protections have failed to live up to their billing, critics argue that Bayh-Dole has
enabled the corporate windfalls legislators feared. Government support for health care R&D is considerable
– taxpayers spend nearly as much on health care R&D as private industry – and these critics allege that
taxpayers could do better on both their intramural and extramural investments.101 On intramural research,
for example, Arno and Davis point out that during the seven-year period from 1993 to 1999, the NIH received
royalties totaling only $200 million – this is less than 1% of the NIH’s funding for intramural research.102
100Dr. Harold Varmus, Director, National Institutes of Health, Office of the Director, Determination in the
Case of Petition of Cellpro, Inc. (Aug. 1997).
101A study conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example, found that of the 21 most important drugs
introduced between 1965 and 1992, public funding played a role in 14 (67%). Iain Cockburn (University of British
Columbia) and Rebecca Henderson (MIT), National Bureau of Economic Research, Public-Private Interaction
and the Productivity of Pharmaceutical Research (Apr. 1997). The Boston Globe reported that 45 of the 50 top-selling
drugs from 1992 – 1997 received government funding for some phase of development. Alice Dembner, Public Handouts Enrich
Drug Makers, Scientists, The Boston Globe, Apr. 5, 1998. And perhaps most telling, an NIH report examined the ﬁve top-
selling drugs in 1995 – Zantac, Zovirax, Capoten, Vasotec and Prozac – and found that taxpayer-funded researchers conducted
55% of the published research projects leading to these drugs’ discovery and development (and foreign academic institutions
conducted an additional 30%). NIH Office of Science Policy, NIH Contributions to Pharmaceutical Development:
Case Study Analysis of the Top-Selling Drugs (Feb. 2000).
102Arno & Davis, supra note 3, at 640.
41Critics also call attention to the high prices charged for pharmaceutical drugs funded partially by taxpayers.
One such example is Taxol, a cancer medication. Taxpayers spent $32 million on the drug’s development.103
Late in its development (during Phase III clinical trials), the drug was transferred to Bristol-Myers Squibb
(BMS), for commercialization. BMS’ revenues from the drug are now in the neighborhood of $5 million per
day; in 1999, Taxol generated $1.7 billion in sales for BMS.104 Generic producers report that Taxol can be
manufactured for 7 cents per milligram; Bristol-Myers Squibb is charging $6.09.105 Armed with extreme
examples such as Taxol, Arno and Davis argue that the “march-in” provisions of Bayh-Dole can be and
should be used to force the pharmaceutical industry to charge reasonable prices for drugs.106
Representative Bernie Sanders has introduced legislation for a number of years that calls for enforcement of
the reasonable pricing clause that already exists in Bayh-Dole.107 It is strange to think that new legislation is
necessary simply to enforce the language of previous legislation, but, in this context, that is apparently what
Representative Sanders believes is needed. In 1999, the legislation passed in the House by an overwhelming
margin, but it was not pursued in the Senate.108 In the Senate, Senator Wyden has emerged as an outspoken
skeptic of current policy and has placed increasing pressure on the NIH and other government agencies to
ensure that taxpayers are being protected.
103David Bollier, New America Foundation, Public Assets, Private Profits: Reclaiming the American Commons
in an Age of Market Enclosure (2001).
104BMS discloses revenues from selected products in its annual 10-K ﬁlings with the SEC. These ﬁles are available online at
<http://www.edgar.gov>.
105Raquel Pontes de Campos, supra note 72.
106Arno & Davis, supra note 3.
107Under the proposed legislation, the Secretary of HHS would have broad discretion to establish criteria and a methodology
for determining reasonable prices. The Secretary would, however, be required to consider competitive bidding and certain
speciﬁc alternatives. The speciﬁc competitive bidding methods would award the exclusive license to the ﬁrm that charged the
lowest price, agreed to the shortest term of exclusivity, or agreed to a reasonable pricing formula after the shortest time or least
amount of sales revenue. The secretary could also adopt other methods, and could also set conditions on the license such as
required expenditures on research and development. 146 Cong. Rec. H4291 (daily ed. June 13, 2000).
108Id.; See also Robert Pear, In Policy Change, House Republicans Call for Government Guarantee of Drug Beneﬁts, N.Y.
Times, June 14, 2000, at A25.
42To summarize, the debate over whether taxpayers are maximizing the return on their investment is a hot
one. Everyone agrees that the fundamental goal of tech transfer policy is to maximize human health by
commercializing government-funded inventions, and nearly everyone agrees that exclusive licenses are neces-
sary to ensure this commercialization. However, the taxpayer protections built into these exclusive licenses
are the subject of ﬁerce debate. Lax enforcement of reporting requirements is widely recognized to be a
problem. And, failure to exercise march-in rights has, according to critics, led to corporate windfalls like
that demonstrated by Taxol. Going forward, the challenge is to devise a formula for “reasonable terms”
that guarantees to private industry neither more than nor less than the ﬁnancial return necessary to ensure
commercialization.
II.B.3. Is Technology Transfer Facilitating Research in a Way That Maximizes Human Health?
The third and ﬁnal question raised by critics of tech transfer policy steps back to ask a larger question:
is technology transfer policy in accord with its broader purpose of maximizing human health and welfare?
These critics fear that the current policy may be having the unintended consequence of impeding the progress
of biomedical R&D. The critique has two elements. First, critics argue that policy may be encouraging
scientists to spend time on proﬁtable medications while discouraging scientists from examining less proﬁtable
medications with greater health beneﬁts. Second, critics fear that the proﬁt motive may be impeding scientiﬁc
progress by stiﬂing the free exchange of information and depleting the public domain of valuable scientiﬁc
data.
It is widely recognized that universities and university scientists are increasingly driven by a proﬁt motive.
Whereas thirty years ago university scientists were most concerned with publishing inﬂuential papers and
obtaining professional prestige, today, university labs are also driven by patents and proﬁts. Dr. Marc
Kirschner, Chair of the Department of Cell Biology at Harvard Medical School, is both excited about and
43wary of the fact that scientists are increasingly focused on the application of their scientiﬁc ideas outside
the lab.109 “Today,” he states, “every scientist is thinking about starting a company. The expectation is all
around to do that.” Universities encourage this by continually asking if the scientists can patent anything
that they are doing. And the consequences, according to Kirschner, are troubling. Instead of teaching
students, scientists worry about their companies. Instead of collaborating, scientists worry about their
property and proﬁt. They are “distracted.”110 Not only are scientists themselves increasingly concerned
with their personal proﬁt, so too are the university laboratories in which they work.
University revenues, whether lump-sum payments or shares of revenue streams, from scientiﬁc inventions
continue to grow. Yale University, for instance, earned $151,000 in royalties from its patented inventions in
1982. By 1997, that ﬁgure had grown to $13.5 million.111 Despite their growth, revenues from royalties still
only account for a small percentage of university research budgets. Even the University of California system,
which has led universities in tech transfer-related royalty payments in recent years, relies on royalties for only
3% of its total research budget.112 Yet even these comparatively small revenue streams are tremendously
important. In 1998, all but $2 million of Yale’s $42 million in royalty revenues came from a single drug – Zerit.
The patent on this drug expires in 2008, and “I worry about that everyday,” said Jonathan Soderstrom,
director of the school’s Oﬃce of Cooperative Research.113
The ﬁrst critique of today’s more proﬁt-driven policy, it is argued, is that it discourages scientists from
engaging in research with the greatest potential to maximize human health and welfare. Vaccines, for
109Telephone Interview with Dr. Marc Kirschner, supra note 79.
110Kirschner also noted that serious conﬂicts of interest may arise, as when scientists use university property or government
grants to speciﬁcally further the aims of their companies. He notes, however, that Harvard maintains a strong policy preventing
this behavior. Id.
111M2 Communications Ltd., Yale University, Yale announces formation of valuable new biotechnology firm
(Mar. 27, 1998).
112NIH Response, supra note 5, at Appendix 2 (Council on Government Relations (COGR) letter to Dr. Wendy Baldwin,
Deputy Director, Extramural Research, NIH, June 5, 2001, page 4).
113Letitia Stein, Yale U. Medical School plans uncertain ﬁnancial future, The Yale Herald, Sept. 24, 1999.
44example, have greater potential to maximize human health than once-a-day treatment medications. Ideally,
university scientists would focus on the former. Industry, however, has focused on the latter (presumably
because it is better for their bottom line.) To the extent that current technology transfer policy has all
scientists – federal and university scientists included – more focused on proﬁt, the federally-funded scientists
may take in the future the same route that industry has taken in the past. Similar logic implies that federally-
funded scientists may also decide, as private industry already has, that devoting resources to ﬁnding cures
for third-world killers like malaria and tuberculosis simply doesn’t pay.
Some scientists dispute this logic. Proﬁts, it is argued, tend to correlate with health beneﬁts – after all,
people are willing to pay for it. And Kirschner, for one, argues that the problem with malaria lies upstream.
“There is enough incentive for scientists,” he argues, “but not enough for drug companies and the NIH.”114
And the incentive for scientists is not purely prestige – Kirschner claims that the ﬁnancial incentive is also
considerable.
More troublesome to scientists like Kirschner is the second issue with today’s proﬁt-driven policy, namely,
whether it impedes scientiﬁc progress by stiﬂing the free exchange of information. Collaboration and open
exchanges of information are critical to scientiﬁc progress, and Kirschner has found that the proﬁt motive
is stiﬂing collaboration among scientists. Proﬁts depend upon property, leading scientists to keep ideas and
progress secret in the hope of keeping discoveries to themselves. Virginia Ashby Sharpe of the Washington,
D.C.-based Center for Science in the Public Interest explains that “there are conﬂicts of interest when
an academic researcher’s primary commitment to the use of sound procedures in the unbiased search for
truth is placed in competition with other [ﬁnancial or personal] interests that might eclipse the primary
commitment.”115 Along the same lines, Eisenberg argues that patents and property interests can “interfere
114Telephone Interview with Dr. Marc Kirschner, supra note 79.
115Joseph Paone, When Big Pharma Courts Academia, The Scientist 16[2]:48 (Jan. 21, 2002).
45with technology transfer and with the broader goal of promoting continuing technological progress. These
goals may sometimes be better served by allocating new knowledge to the public domain.”116
A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association shocked the scientiﬁc community by
ﬁnding that “47% of the academic geneticists who asked other colleagues for information, data and materials
related to published research were turned down.”117 Sheldon Krimsky, a Tufts University researcher who
studies the ethics of scientists, notes that “this study shows that commercial interests are beginning to aﬀect
the norms of science in a substantial way. Refusing to share scientiﬁc information aﬀects one of the most
unique aspects of science: its self-correcting function.” Once denied access to the data, the study reports,
geneticists were unable to conﬁrm published data, and one in ﬁve abandoned a promising line of investigation.
To summarize, a third critical area of debate over technology transfer is whether today’s proﬁt-driven policy
may be having the unintended consequence of impeding scientiﬁc progress. Current policy may succeed in
spawning biotech ﬁrms and bringing new medications to the market, but, it may also stiﬂe scientiﬁc advance.
First, what is most proﬁtable may not necessarily match that which maximizes human health and welfare.
Second, the proﬁt motive may be stiﬂing collaboration between scientists and depleting the public domain
of information. Addressing these problems may not require wholesale retreat from exclusive licensing, but
some tinkering in current policy may be in order.
II.C. Perspectives on the Current Debates
It is, ﬁrst and foremost, remarkable that there are so few legal voices taking part in these important debates.
Taxpayers spend over $20 billion each year on foundational biomedical research. This investment gives to
116Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1727.
117Peter Gorner, Many scientists won’t share research data, study ﬁnds, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 23, 2002, at 10.
46the government background rights in a high percentage of biomedical intellectual property. Analyses of this
intellectual property that fail to consider the statutory and administrative regime of technology transfer are,
in a sense, wholly ignoring the “public” element of this giant public-private partnership. The absence of legal
voices is even more alarming if one believes, as previously argued, that property law and the public-private
distinction have inﬂuenced policy developments.
Second, just as the international implications of tech transfer policy were neglected in the past, so too
are they being neglected in these debates of the present. Of course, the international aspects of patent
law receive a great deal of attention, particularly those pertaining to the WTO’s agreement on intellectual
property (TRIPS). But these debates do not distinguish products funded entirely by private investors from
products developed partially with public funding. Inequality is a major source of tension in global politics,
and one major component of inequality is unequal access to technology (including life-saving medications).
From a foreigner’s perspective, it is bad enough to be denied access to technology because it is in the hands
of a private American company. It is even worse if certain rights to this technology are in fact in the hands
of the American people. For this reason it is simply shortsighted to develop tech transfer policy without
consideration of its impact on international relations.
Interestingly, although international implications have not yet surfaced in the debate over tech transfer, they
have begun to surface in other debates concerning the overall mission of health care and access to essential
medicines. Representatives from government, private industry, schools of medicine, and schools of public
health are increasingly recognizing that current health care policies are giving inadequate attention to the
biomedical needs of poorer individuals and nations. Especially since the attacks of September 11th, more and
47more commentators are coming to view global health care not as a cause of sympathy and charity, but rather
as an investment in stability, security and even economic growth.118 Africa’s inability to access HIV/AIDS
medications has been the most common subject of this debate. To address these issues, a growing consensus
of commentators is advocating “experiments” with new “public-private partnerships.”119 The contours of
these partnerships remain for the most part undeﬁned, and completely overlooked is the fact that the drug
development process is, in a sense, already a public-private partnership. Thus the successes and failures
of tech transfer can inform the development of new public-private partnerships designed to address global
inequity, and global inequity, in turn, should inform the development of tech transfer policy.
Third, and ﬁnally, all three of the current debates suﬀer dramatically from a lack of information. The
government has, through grossly inadequate enforcement of reporting requirements, lost track of many
government-funded inventions. The government has failed to adequately analyze whether any of its inventions
are currently or have in the past been languishing in their labs. Universities are failing to abide by the
reporting requirements and, it is argued, are also enabling the pursuit of proﬁts to stiﬂe free exchanges of
information. Lastly, private industry is contributing to the information blackout by failing to come forward
with information about drug development, most notably at the clinical trials phase.120
The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) is trying to ﬁll this information vacuum with calls for greater
transparency in the ﬁeld of pharmaceutical economics.121 Speciﬁcally, TACD has recommended that the
118Linda Distlerath, Vice President, Global Health Policy for Merck & Co., Address at the Harvard Health Caucus at Harvard
Medical School Spring 2002 Roundtable Series (Feb. 28, 2002); Valerie Epps, Professor, Suﬀolk University Law School, Address
at the Harvard Health Caucus at Harvard Medical School Spring 2002 Roundtable Series (Mar. 20, 2002).
119Dr. Lincoln Chen, Director, Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University, Address at the Harvard Health Caucus at Harvard
Medical School Spring 2002 Roundtable Series (Feb. 28, 2002). The conceptualization of “new” public-private partnerships has
been particularly active in research for an AIDS vaccine.
120Congress has the power to subpoena much of this information, but has not exercised its authority to do so.
121Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, Transparency of Pharmaceutical Economics (2001) (available at
48United States and the European Union publish data detailing government outlays on foundational research
and clinical testing. TACD also recommends that industry be required to disclose, for any product on
the market, costs associated with the product’s development and clinical testing, and how these costs were
distributed among the company, government, and third parties.
Good policy cannot be formed in an information vacuum. Yet, that is the location of all three current
debates over the direction of tech transfer. The remainder of this article is motivated by a desire to see
this vacuum ﬁlled. The next section of the article provides a detailed account of the development of one
particular drug – Zerit. This fact-based narrative will then be used to inform these current debates.
III.
Zerit: Technology Transfer in Action
What follows is a narrative description of the development and commercialization of Zerit, an eﬀective
AIDS medication that resulted from successful collaboration among government, universities and private
industry. The purpose of telling this factual narrative is to bring a measure of actual, real-world experience
to the otherwise untethered debate over technology transfer. This experience can inform the policy-makers
grappling with the controversial issues outlined in the previous section. Indeed policy-makers need much




49Zerit is the brand name that has been given to the compound d4T. Its generic name is stavudine. It is one
of 15 antiretroviral agents now approved to ﬁght AIDS.122 Eﬀective treatment of HIV/AIDS requires the
combined use of several of these medications. Zerit in particular is a nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase
inhibitor (or “nucleoside analog”). As do all nucleoside analogs (like AZT, ddI and ddC), Zerit inhibits the
ability of the HIV virus to reproduce.123
Zerit is a good candidate for a focused case study of tech transfer for a number of reasons. First, it is
an example of technology transfer working at its best. Government funds were dedicated to addressing an
emerging health epidemic – HIV/AIDS – and university scientists rushed to the cause. The medication
was discovered and then transferred to private industry, who quickly pushed the drug through clinical trials
and the FDA approval process. This is the way the process is supposed to work. It is a success story. A
critique of current policy should take a look at how it is operating at its best; to instead examine a failure
is to set up a straw man. Second, and equally important, the timing of Zerit allows for examination of
both its transfer and its commercialization under the Bayh-Dole regime. Government grants supporting the
foundational research into Zerit occurred in the early 1980s. Under Bayh-Dole, title in the invention vested
in Yale University. Then Yale licensed the drug to private industry in 1988, late enough that the Bayh-Dole
regime of technology transfer had largely matured. At the same time, the transfer occurred far enough into
the past to allow for a record of both its clinical phase and its commercialization. Third, the extent of the
122The antiretroviral agents approved to ﬁght HIV/AIDS fall into one of two general classes: reverse transcriptase inhibitors
(RTIs) and protease inhibitors (PIs). Within the RTI class are two subclasses - the nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase
inhibitors (nRTIs) and non-nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NNRTIs) - which are distinguished by their
binding site with the HIV reverse transcriptase enzyme. Both subclasses interfere with HIV’s ability to convert viral genetic
material, called RNA, into DNA, which the virus needs in order to incorporate into a cell’s DNA. Protease inhibitors act by
prohibiting HIV from cleaving large, biologically inactive viral protein precursors (polyproteins) into functionally active viral
proteins.
123Zerit is known as a relatively “benign” AIDS medication, meaning that its potency is relatively weak compared to other
medications on the market. So too, however, are the extent of its side eﬀects, making Zerit a good choice medication for patients
who cannot tolerate or do not need the high potency but nasty side eﬀects of more powerful medications. The recommended
dosage of Zerit is two capsules (each of 40mg) per day. Nearly all patients remain on the medication for life. However, if all
signs of the virus have disappeared then it is possible to stop taking the medication. Should any sign of the virus reemerge, the
patient is advised to immediately return to the medication.
50AIDS epidemic in Africa raises for Zerit exactly the international issues that have been neglected in past
and present debates over the policy’s direction.
Fourth, and ﬁnally, the extent of the AIDS epidemic has brought attention to the drug’s development,
shining a light on information that otherwise may not have been available. As the purpose of presenting
this narrative is to provide a measure of factual data capable of informing technology transfer policy, the
availability of this information is very helpful. Unfortunately, some important information pertaining to
Zerit has not yet come to light. Neither Bristol-Myers Squibb nor Yale’s Oﬃce of Cooperative Research
responded to certain research inquiries, leaving some gaps in the narrative. These gaps will be noted as they
arise.
III.B. An Initial Disclaimer
The extent of the AIDS epidemic is well-documented and widely publicized. Over 450,000 Americans have
died from the disease. In 2002, 323,000 Americans are living with AIDS; 850,000 are living with HIV. There
are 40,000 new HIV infections every year.124 As (nearly) all Americans have access to HIV medication, the
rate of death from the disease has, in recent years, tapered oﬀ.125 In other regions of the world, however,
the epidemic is far from contained. UNAIDS reports that, in 2001, a staggering 2.3 million Africans died of
AIDS. That is more than 6,000 people per day. The same year witnessed the infection of 3.4 million more
Africans, bringing the current total of infected individuals on that continent to 28.1 million.
124Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, A Glance at the HIV Epidemic
(2001).
125Dr. Frank J. Palella, Declining Morbidity and Mortality Among Patients With Advanced Human Immunodeﬁcieincy Virus
Infection, 338 N.E.J.Med. 853 (Mar. 26, 1998).
51Much has been written and much has been read about the emergence and impact of AIDS. It is not the
purpose of this article to recount this tragic tale in depth. It is rather my intention to recount the tale of
Zerit, and this requires situating its development within the context of the AIDS epidemic. An overview
of the epidemic provides necessary background to government, university and private industry action under
the Bayh-Dole regime of technology transfer.
III.C. The Development of Zerit
III.C.1. The Epidemic Begins
“A serious disorder of the immune system that has been known to doctors for less than a year - a disorder
that appears to aﬀect primarily male homosexuals - has now aﬄicted at least 335 people, of whom it has
killed 136,” the New York Times reported on May 11, 1982.126 The article went on to note that “federal
health oﬃcials are concerned that tens of thousands more homosexual men may be silently aﬀected and
therefore vulnerable to potentially grave ailments.... The cause of the disorder is unknown. Researchers
call it A.I.D., for acquired immunodeﬁciency disease, or GRID, for gay-related immunodeﬁciency.” The
disease and news of the disease spread quickly. In February 1983, the New York Times Magazine reported
that the disease was “the century’s most virulent epidemic.”127 By June 1983, 1,450 cases of AIDS had been
reported nationwide. More than half of these cases (722) had been diagnosed in New York City, and 262
126Lawrence K. Altman, New Homosexual Disorder Worries Health Oﬃcials, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1982, at C1.
127Robin Marantz Henig, AIDS: A New Disease’s Deadly Odyssey, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1983, at 28.
52of these 722 cases had already resulted in death. San Francisco was also hard hit, with an incidence rate
10 times the national average.128 Although the exact science had not yet been worked out, two “high-risk”
groups had been identiﬁed: homosexuals and intravenous drug users.129 By April 1984, over 4,000 Americans
had contracted AIDS, most of them homosexuals, and 1,750 of these individuals had died.130
In 1984 the U.S. government responded by devoting more public resources to the crisis. In February 1984,
legislators debated how best to do this – whether to play a more active role in directing NIH’s attention
to the matter, or, allowing for NIH to develop its own response to the emerging epidemic.131 Ultimately
the latter course was pursued, and the NIH began to pay increased attention to AIDS. By mid-1984, more
than $75 million had already been spent on foundational AIDS research, primarily at NIH laboratories in
Bethesda, MD.132 The increase in funding had begun to produce results. In April 1984, at the NIH lab
in Bethesda, Dr. Gallo conﬁrmed his recent study identifying the family of viruses central to AIDS. Gallo
also developed a cell line that made it possible to grow the viruses, an event that was hailed at the time as
“a turning point” in the ﬁght against AIDS.133 Meanwhile, a team of French researchers working in Paris
succeeded in singling out from the family Gallo had identiﬁed the particular strain of the virus known as
HIV.134
The period from 1984 to 1986 witnessed the unfolding of three important strands of the AIDS crisis. First,
the two high-risk groups – homosexuals and intravenous drug users – continued to receive the lion’s share of
attention, and with this attention came a certain measure of ostracization. The public was under-informed
128Sam Roberts, Medical Detectives Hunt Clues to AIDS Outbreak, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1983, at 25.
129Id.
130Philip M. Boﬀey, A Likely AIDS Cause, But Still No Cure, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1984, at 22.
131Robert Pear, Congress Rethinks Its Hands-Oﬀ Policy on Medical Research, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984, at 3.
132President Reagan budgeted $54 million for ﬁscal year 1985. Boﬀey, supra note 130.
133Id.
134Initial ﬁndings were reported as early as May 1983, but the ﬁndings were conﬁrmed in April 1984. Id.
53as to how the virus was transmitted, causing many to shun interaction with members of the high-risk groups.
These two groups were thus hard hit not only by the disease itself, but also by the ostracization that came
with it. Of course, members of these groups were not the only individuals coming down with the virus.
Others were also inﬂicted ﬁrst by the virus, and then by the ostracization that came with it. In New York,
for example, children who contracted the disease were not allowed to return to school.135
Second, by the end of 1986 it had become quite clear that AIDS was an epidemic of not national but
international signiﬁcance. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), it had become “a health
disaster of pandemic proportions.”136 In October 1986, the WHO reported that from January through
mid-September, the number of AIDS cases recorded worldwide had risen from 20,476 to 31,646.137 While
the vast majority of these cases were recorded in the United States, the WHO also reported sharp increases
in West Germany, France, Italy, Australia and New Zealand. The most striking increase was in Africa,
where 10 countries reported 1,003 cases by mid-September, up from 31 reported at the start of the year. By
December, the New York Times was reporting that Latin America and Asia were also facing potential AIDS
crises. The WHO reported that Brazil was facing an “African-style epidemic of AIDS.”138 No medications
had yet made it to the market, and precious few AIDS patients were living longer than ﬁve years.
Third, the scientiﬁc community continued, unsuccessfully, their frustrating struggle to ﬁnd a cure.139 Al-
though the government stepped up its funding – for ﬁscal year 1986, Congress appropriated $244 million
to ﬁght AIDS – $140 million dedicated to scientiﬁc research and the remainder going to prevention and
education140 – little progress had been made. “Vast ignorance” remained, and scientists did not believe that
135Dudley Clendinen, Schools in New York Will Admit an AIDS Pupil But Not 3 Others, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at 1.
136Lawrence K. Altman, Global Program Aims to Combat AIDS ‘Disaster,’ N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1986, at 1.
137Thomas W. Netter, AIDS Cases Are Said to Rise Sharply Worldwide, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1986, at 1; See also Ed Hooper,
An African Village Staggers Under the Assault of AIDS, N.Y. Times, September 30, 1986, at C1.
138AIDS in the Third World, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at C15.
139Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor’s World: Search for an AIDS drug is case history in frustration, N.Y. Times, July 30,
1985, at C1.
140Morton Hunt, Teaming Up Against AIDS, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1986, at 42.
54the disease could be defeated within a few years.141 On the positive side, several promising leads had been
identiﬁed, though none of these leads had emerged from the laborious process of clinical testing mandated
by the FDA. It was around this time – the end of 1986 – that Dr. William Prusoﬀ and Dr. Tai-Shun Lin
discovered that d4T, the compound that would come to be marketed under the brand name of Zerit, was
active against the HIV virus.
III.C.2. The Preclinical Phase
Among the many scientists who responded to the emerging AIDS epidemic were two professors at Yale
University – Dr. Tai-Shun Lin and Dr. William Prusoﬀ. These scientists had years of experience exploring
novel antivirals. Early eﬀorts had produced idoxuridine, a clinically-useful, FDA-approved antiviral agent.
In the early-1980s, the scientists had been focusing their attention on several families of compounds with
potential activity as antivirals; in 1984, Dr. Prusoﬀ and Dr. Lin reported to the NIH that 5’-amino nucleoside
analogs had “good potential as antivirals” and that 3’-amino nucleosides had “good anti-cancer activity.”142
The scientists continued to receive NIH funding for their eﬀorts, and they now began to test these compounds
for activity as antivirals. The jewel among these compounds would turn out to be d4T (3’-deoxythymidin-2’-
ene), a compound ﬁrst synthesized in 1966, by Dr. Jerome P. Horowitz, at the Michigan Cancer Foundation
(Karmanos Cancer Institute).143
When Dr. Horowitz ﬁrst synthesized d4T, he had been working with federal funding provided by the
National Cancer Institute.144 Federal funding was also the primary means of support for the research later
141Erik Eckholm, AIDS: Scientists voice concern over research, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1986, at C1.
142Dr. William Prusoff, Iododeoxyuridine, Iodo-DNA and Biological Activity, Grant Application to the NIH,
2R01CA005262-25 (1985).
143The compound is more fully described as 3’-deoxy-2’, 3 –didehydrothymidine.
144Tina Rosenberg, How to Solve the World’s AIDS Crisis, N.Y. Times Magazine, Jan. 28, 2001, at 31.
55conducted at Yale University – Dr. Prusoﬀ had been working with NIH grants for decades.145 Importantly,
the NIH funding was supplemented by sizeable ﬁnancial support from private industry. In the early 1980s,
Bristol-Myers gave $500,000 to Yale University to help ﬁnance research in antivirals.146 In return, Bristol-
Myers was given the right of ﬁrst refusal to license any Yale inventions in this ﬁeld. Importantly, according
to Dr. Prusoﬀ, Bristol-Myers’ grant did not enable the company to direct the course of Yale’s research.
University scientists maintained “complete academic freedom.”147 At the same time, despite their academic
freedom, the university scientists were nevertheless able to take advantage of the resources that Bristol-Myers
laboratories had to oﬀer.
The events that follow show an extraordinary level of cooperation among the NIH, universities and Bristol-
Myers. In 1985, Dr. Prusoﬀ and Dr. Lin synthesized the d4T compound. The scientists sent it to Bristol-
Myers to test for retroviral activity, though not for activity against the AIDS retrovirus in particular.
Bristol-Myers reported that d4T was, in fact, active against retrovirus. The next step involved testing the
compound for activity against the AIDS retrovirus in particular, but neither Yale nor Bristol-Myers had the
laboratory capacity to do so. (Remember that the HIV virus had itself been identiﬁed less than two years
prior.) Thus, in January 1986, Bristol-Myers sent d4T to the NIH to test for activity against AIDS. Despite
the increase in government resources being devoted to AIDS, the NIH was swamped and therefore slow to
conduct the test. The end of the summer arrived and there was still no word from the NIH. In September
1986, rather than continuing to wait on the NIH, Dr. Prusoﬀ decided to send the compound to his friend
and colleague, Dr. Raymond Schinazi, at Emory University. The Emory laboratory had the necessary
technology to test the compound for activity against AIDS. Within the month Dr. Schinazi reported back to
145The speciﬁc grant that funded the research into d4T ran from 1981 through 1985. Dr. William Prusoff, synthesis and
biological evaluation of a novel series of nucleoside analogs, grant application to the nih, 1P01CA028852-010001
(1981). Another NIH grant supporting the work of Dr. Prusoﬀ at this time was a longstanding study that ran from 1971
through 1994. Dr. William Prusoff, supra note 142.
146Interview with Dr. William Prusoﬀ, supra note 79.
147Id.
56Dr. Prusoﬀ that d4T was in fact active against AIDS.148 NIH delivered the same positive news two months
later, in November 1986. On December 17, 1986, Yale ﬁled for a patent.149 In accordance with the reporting
procedures mandated by Bayh-Dole, the patent application recognized that federal funds contributed to the
compound’s development.150 Results of the research were submitted for publishing in 1987 and ultimately
published in 1988.151
The initial laboratory collaboration was successful: Government funds were allocated to respond to an emerg-
ing health epidemic; experienced university scientists took advantage of this federal funding and quickly
turned their attention to the ﬁeld; and private industry saw an opportunity and contributed both ﬁnancial
and technical support. Interestingly, while foundational research is typically regarded as the work of govern-
ment and universities, in the case of Zerit, private industry joined in the collaboration to speed the process
along. Dr. Prusoﬀ indicated that without the ﬁnancial and technical assistance of Bristol-Myers, the same
result would have likely been obtained, but the process would have taken much longer. At the same time,
neither Bristol-Myers nor Yale had all of the necessary expertise and technical capacity. When they reached
an impasse, they called ﬁrst on the NIH and then on Emory University to conduct the necessary testing.
III.C.3. From Clinical Testing to FDA Approval
148Id.
149The United States patent was ultimately granted on Dec. 18, 1990 (Patent # 4,978,655). The patent expires on June 25,
2008. Yale has also been granted patent rights in Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Yale ﬁled for
patent rights in Australia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania,
Singapore, South Africa, and Taiwan.
150The patent states that “This invention was made with United States government support under Grant CA-28852 from the
NIH. The United States Government has certain rights in this invention.” (Patent # 4,978,655).
151TS Lin TS, WH Prusoﬀ, and RF Schinazi, Potent and selective in vitro activity of 3’-deoxythymidin-2’-ene (3’-deoxy-2’,3’-
didehydrothymidine) against human immunodeﬁciency virus, Biochem Pharmacol. 36(17):2713-8 (Sep. 1987).
Dr. William Prusoﬀ, Biochem. Pharmacol. 33: 4419-4422 (1988). In the same year, similar results were published by one team
of Japanese scientists and another team of European scientists. Credit for ﬁrst discovering the compound’s activity, however,
was ultimately bestowed upon the team operating at Yale.
57Having established that the compound was active against the AIDS retrovirus, scientists then turned to the
laborious and time-consuming process of conducting clinical trials. The FDA reports that out of 100 drugs
beginning the human clinical testing process, 20 are ultimately approved for marketing.152 Because of the
expense of conducting these trials, the government and universities typically seek at this stage commitment
from private industry. The government does not take a medication through the clinical trials process entirely
on its own.153 Zerit was no exception to this rule. Yale contacted Bristol-Myers (who, as previously
mentioned, had obtained the right of ﬁrst refusal by way of a prior grant) to discuss terms for licensing.154
On January 12, 1988, the two parties signed an agreement under which Bristol-Myers obtained an exclusive
license to market and distribute d4T.155 (The following year, in October 1989, Bristol-Myers merged with
Squibb to create what was, at that time, the second largest pharmaceutical company in the world.)
As previously mentioned, clinical trials are predominantly funded by the private sector. However, public and
university participation can often play an important supporting role.156 First, trials are often conducted
at university laboratories, and the universities themselves provide certain costs (including laboratory space,
salaries of participating doctors, etc.). Second, private industry will at times desire independent, objective
scientists to conduct a clinical trial, for such trials are looked upon favorably by the FDA in the approval
process. These independent trials are funded primarily by the government and by institutes for research.
Third, where there is a pressing public health need, the government may take certain measures to speed
152U.S. Food and Drug Administration & Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Special Report,
Third Edition, From Test Tube to Patient: Improving Health Through Human Drugs (1999) (available at
<www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-3a.pdf>). This statistic is corroborated by PhRMA.
153Telephone Interview with Dr. Henry Sacks, Mount Sinai Medical Center, Clinical Testing (Mar. 20, 2002).
154The author was unable to obtain more detailed information on the process by which Bristol-Myers negotiated for this
exclusive license. It is thus unknown whether Bristol-Myers was eager to pursue their right of ﬁrst refusal, or, whether Yale
had to push hard to ﬁnd a corporation willing to undertake the clinical trials.
155James Love (visited Mar. 22, 2002) <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids/gov-role.html>.
156Telephone Interview with Henry Sacks, supra note 153.
58drugs through the clinical testing and FDA-approval process. As AIDS was a pressing public health need,
the government did in fact assist d4T in the clinical testing and approval process.
From 1988 through 2001, there were 109 clinical trials involving d4T – 53 sponsored by the government and
59 sponsored by private industry (predominantly by Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS)).157 Of these, six trials
supported d4T’s application for FDA approval: three Phase I studies, one Phase II study, one Phase III
study, and one “investigational use” study. Phase I human clinical testing establishes safe dosage levels. The
ﬁrst of three Phase I tests on Zerit began on March 23, 1989.158 This test, which succeeded in establishing
a maximum tolerated dose, was conducted at the Brown University AIDS program and had an accrual of 41
patients. The second Phase I test was conducted at the Division of Infectious Diseases at Cornell University
Medical College, and it also had an accrual of 41 patients.159 This test succeeded in establishing safe dosage.
The third Phase I study was a pharmacology study involving 23 patients.160 These Phase I trials were jointly
supported by BMS, universities and grants from the NIAID of the NIH.161 The Phase II trial, conducted at
the University of Arizona, Tucson, established the safety of administering oral dosages of d4T three times
per day.162 This test, involving 152 patients, was also supported by both BMS and the government.163
157ACTIS Database (visited Mar. 22, 2002) <www.actis.gov>. The majority of these tests were conducted after the drug had
already obtained FDA approval. Such testing is generally conducted on potential additional uses and applications of the drug.
158MJ Browne, KH Mayer, SB Chafee, MN Dudley, MR Posner, SM Steinberg, KK Graham, SM Geletko, SH Zinner, SL
Denman, et al., 2’,3’-didehydro-3’-deoxythymidine (d4T) in patients with AIDS or AIDS-related complex: a phase I trial, 167
J. Infect Dis. 21 (1993). See also G. Skowron, Overview of Phase I & Phase II, 171 J. Infect. Dis. (Supp2), S113 (1995).
159HW Murray, KE Squires, W Weiss, S Sledz, HS Sacks, J Hassett, A Cross, RE Anderson, LM Dunkle, Stavudine in patients
with AIDS and AIDS-related complex: AIDS clinical trials group 089, 171 J. Infect. Dis. (Supp.2), S123 (1995).
160MN Dudley, KK Graham, S Kaul, S Geletko, L Dunkle, M Browne, K Mayer, Pharmocokinetics of Patients with AIDS,
166 J. Infect. Dis. 480 (1992).
161NIH grants supporting the clinical testing of d4T include Grant #s 5M01RR000071-270199, M01RR000071-290246, and
5M01RR000071-300246.
162EA Petersen, CH Ramirez-Ronda, WD Hardy, R Schwartz, HS Sacks, S Follansbee, DM Peterson , A Cross, RE Anderson,
LM Dunkle, Dose-related activity of stavudine in patients infected with human immunodeﬁciency virus, 171 J. Infect Dis.
(Supp. 2) S131 (1995).
163NIH grants supporting this clinical test included Grant #s 5M01RR000071-290260, 5M01RR000071-300260, and
5M01RR000071-310260.
59The year was 1992, a time during which each AIDS drug in the pipeline, including Zerit, was the subject of
great hope and anticipation. AZT had been approved by the FDA in 1987, ddI in 1991, and ddC in 1992, yet
these three medications had not completely met the AIDS community’s need for eﬀective medications. There
was thus pressure on the government to speed promising AIDS drugs through the clinical trial and approval
process.164 Indeed since mid-1985, at which time 6,000 Americans had already died from AIDS, the FDA
had been pressured to relax its otherwise stringent clinical testing requirements for AIDS medications.165
Participants in clinical trials had a 50-50 chance of receiving a mere placebo, and the half that received
the active drug risked dangerously strong side eﬀects. At the end of 1986, of 17,000 AIDS patients in the
U.S., 4,000 were participating in drug trials. These patients “considered themselves lucky.”166 In 1990, the
National Commission on AIDS focused speciﬁcally on enrollment in clinical studies and reported to President
Bush that the government’s eﬀort at drug development “falls far short of the mark.” The Commission found
that only 12,000 people were involved in clinical trials, a “pitifully small” ﬁgure compared to the number
eligible.167
By 1992, just three years after its ﬁrst Phase I clinical trial began, d4T had successfully emerged from both
Phase I and Phase II trials and was making waves in the AIDS community. Doctors at AIDS clinics in
hard-hit areas – New York and San Francisco – had been following the drug’s progress ever since its ﬁrst
Phase I trial.168 Now that stavudine had been found to be safe and initial data on its eﬀectiveness were
positive, the number of AIDS patients clamoring to get their hands on it was considerable.169
164Gina Kolata, Interest Grows in Licensing Shortcut for Two AIDS Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1990, at 3.
165Harry Schwartz, Finding a Cure for AIDS, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at 23.
166Erik Eckholm, Should the Rules be Bent in an Epidemic?, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1986, at 30.
167Philip J. Hilts, Panel Issues Broad Attack on U.S. Response to AIDS, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1990, at 4.
168Interview with Dr. Kevin Williams, in Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 6, 2001).
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60In May 1992, BMS began a Phase III trial involving 822 patients.170 Compared to the Phase I and Phase
II studies, the Phase III study relied more heavily on funding from BMS (though it was coordinated at the
Health Sciences AIDS Center at the University of Utah School of Medicine). It was also, in part, supported
by government funding.171 Because stavudine was such a promising essential medicine, thousands of patients
desired access to the drug – many more than the 822 participating in the study. In October 1992 the FDA
responded to this demand by making d4T the ﬁrst medication ever to receive from the FDA so-called
“parallel-track” status for expanded “investigational use.” This new program was developed by the FDA
to allow for wider access to promising medications in late stages of clinical testing. BMS coordinated the
study and provided the medication for free, while doctors in medical centers and clinics around the country
monitored its eﬀects on participating patients. In less than eight months, over 8,000 patients obtained access
to the medication through this trial.172
On December 28, 1993, BMS ﬁled a New Drug Application (NDA) with the FDA. Under the FDA’s accel-
erated approval policy for essential medications, clinical testing must demonstrate that the compound has
an eﬀect on a surrogate endpoint and that the compound satisﬁes an unmet medical need. For d4T, this
surrogate endpoint was increased CD4 cell counts (cells that the human body uses to ﬁght HIV). The Phase
III trial obtained this surrogate endpoint in 359 patients,173 and d4T was approved by the FDA on June 24,
1994.174 By this date, more than 13,000 patients had obtained access to d4T through the “investigational
170SL Spruance, AT Pavia, JW Mellors, R Murphy, J Gathe Jr., E Stool, JG Jemsek, P Dellamonica, A Cross, L Dunkle,
Clinical eﬃcacy of monotherapy with stavudine compared with zidovudine in HIV-infected, zidovudine-experienced patients. A
randomized, double-blind, controlled trial, Bristol-Myers Squibb Stavudine/019 Study Group, 126(5) Ann Intern Med 355 (Mar.
1997) (Trial # AI455-019).
171NIH grants supporting this clinical test included Grant #s 5M01RR000071-300287, 5M01RR000071-310287,
5M01RR000071-320287, and 2M01RR000071-330287.
172RE Anderson, LM Dunkle, L Smaldone, M Adler, C Wirtz, D Kriesel, A Cross, RR Martin, Design and
implementation of the stavudine parallel-track program, 171 J Infect Dis (Suppl 2) S118 (Mar. 1995).
173John Schwartz , FDA Clears 4th Drug to Fight AIDS, Washington Post, June 28, 1994, at A12. In clinical trials of 359
AIDS patients whose immunity-boosting CD4 cells had dropped to a median level of 250 cells per cubic millimeter of blood,
the drug was found to increase the count by 24 cells per cubic millimeter of blood. Patients taking AZT showed a decline of 22
cells over a 12-week treatment period.
174Id.
61use” program.175 Initial shipments of the drug to wholesalers began on July 8, 1994 at the price of $6.22 per
day, making Zerit the ﬁrst new anti-HIV drug to reach the market in nearly two years.176 Overall, Zerit was
the fourth AIDS medication to reach the market, the ﬁrst three being zidovudine (AZT), didanosine (ddI)
and zalcitabine (ddC). (ddI had been marketed by BMS under the brand name Videx since October 1991.)
Further clinical testing on the ﬁnal endpoint continued through mid-1995.177
Only ﬁve years had passed since the ﬁrst Phase I trial had begun, and Zerit had already been used by 13,000
patients and was on the market for widespread use. BMS and the FDA were congratulated for speeding up
a process that generally takes much longer than ﬁve years. Indeed antiretrovirals (such as Zerit) have the
shortest time-to-approval of any class of drugs beginning clinical testing: the mean is 44.6 months, which is
half the industry average of 87.4 months.178 According to Dr. Henry Sacks, a member of the NIH-supported
AIDS Clinical Research team and a leading researcher on several d4T clinical trials, the participation of BMS
was absolutely essential in the clinical testing of Zerit. At the same time, the government’s ﬁnancial support
and the FDA’s policies of “investigational use” and expedited approval helped to speed the process along.
Thus, interestingly, the story of Zerit indicates that what is typically conceptualized as a clean division of
labor (with the government doing the preclinical phase and private industry doing the clinical phase) is
not quite so clean. BMS support helped to speed the development process along in its initial, foundational
stages, and the government’s support speeded the process along in its later stages.
175CW Henderson, Company Announces FDA Approval for HIV Drug, AIDS Weekly, July 11, 1994.
176Id.
177John Schwartz, FDA Sees Promise in New Anti-AIDS Drugs; Commissioner Indicates Agency Will Move Swiftly to
Approve ’Protease Inhibitors’ for Market, Washington Post, Nov. 6, 1995, at A4. BMS ultimately obtained full marketing
approval from the FDA in 1996. Bristol-Myers Drug Approved, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5, 1996, at B10.
178K Kaitin & E Healy, The new drug approvals of 1996, 1997, and 1998: drug development trends in the user fee era, 34
Drug Information Journal 1–14 (2000).
62Estimates of BMS’ out-of-pocket expenses on the development of Zerit are in the $10 million to $40 million
range.179 According to the Tufts Center, the average cost of clinical trials for approved drugs is about $25
million (in 1995 dollars). Considering the fact that the clinical trials for Zerit took half as long as usual and
received above average levels of government funding, it is probable that BMS’ out-of-pocket expenditures on
clinical trials were less than $25 million.180 BMS’ out-of-pocket expenditures also include its initial grant
to Yale University of $500,000, and, more signiﬁcantly, the cost of regulatory ﬁlings (which is well into the
millions). After adjusting these ﬁgures for both risk and opportunity cost of capital, the overall cost to BMS
likely falls in the $150 million to $300 million range (in 1995 dollars).181 Considering the relatively high level
of taxpayer support for Zerit’s development and the speed with which it passed through clinical trials and
FDA approval, this range is consistent with the OTA’s 1993 report pegging the average cost of developing a
drug at $500 million.
III.C.4. Zerit Hits the Market
As might be expected from a drug that had 13,000 people volunteer for clinical testing, the market received
Zerit, the fourth HIV/AIDS medication to obtain FDA approval, with open arms. Initial shipments in 1994
were sold to wholesalers at the price of $6.22 per day. In 2002, the retail cost of the medication hovers in
the $9 per day range (or $3,300 per patient per year). BMS’ revenues from sales of Zerit had, by December
179Interview with Dr. William Prusoﬀ, supra note 79.
180Zerit’s clinical trials were also likely cheaper than the average because the Phase III study involved relatively fewer patients.
This was made possible by the fact that thousands more patients were able to access the drug, at little cost to BMS, through
the “parallel track” program.
181Assume for purposes of this calculation that the clinical trials on Zerit were of average cost. According to the Tufts Center,
the average expenditure on clinical trials is $25 million (in 1995 dollars). To adjust for the risk involved with unsuccessful trials,
the Tufts Center increases this ﬁgure to $55 million. Add $25 million for regulatory ﬁlings (which is on the high end) and then
double or triple the ﬁgure to adjust for opportunity cost of capital (the Tufts Center doubles it), and you end up with a cost
of roughly $150 to $300 million.
6331, 2000, exceeded $2.3 billion.182
For AIDS patients with prescription-drug coverage, the cost of the medication is borne by insurance com-
panies. (The cost is then, presumably, passed through to citizens and employers in the form of higher
premiums.) There are, however, many Americans who do not possess prescription drug coverage (such as
those on Medicare) and who are unable to pay for Zerit out of pocket. The government’s AIDS Drug Assis-
tance Program (ADAP) covers many of these individuals. But there are still some patients who qualify for
neither ADAP nor Medicaid (which oﬀers prescription drug coverage). Thus, there are some patients who
are unable to aﬀord the medication and are unable to get their hands on it.183
As set forth in the licensing agreement between BMS and Yale, Yale receives royalties from sales of Zerit.
Of these revenues, 70% go to the university and 30% go to the drug’s two founders – Dr. Prusoﬀ and Dr. Lin.
In 1999, Yale’s portion of the royalties was $40 million, which was 95% of the university’s total revenues from
royalties on its patents ($42 million). On October 5, 2001, Yale exchanged its rights to Zerit’s revenues for
an up-front payment of $115 million. About $60 million of this total is going into a new medical complex.184
Yale is among the ﬁrst universities to have completed a so-called monetizing deal on its patent royalties.
III.C.5. The Rich Have, the Poor Have Not
182In 1996, BMS’ revenues were $140 million; in 1997, $398 million; in 1998, $551 million; in 1999, $605 million; and, in 2000,
$618 million. BMS discloses revenues from selected products in its annual 10-K ﬁlings with the SEC. These ﬁles are available
online at <http://www.edgar.gov>.
183Interview with Dr. Kevin Williams, supra note 168.
184The terms of this complicated deal are explained in Goldie Blumenstyk, Turning Patent Royalties Into a Sure Thing, The
Chronicle of Higher Education, Oct. 5, 2001, at 26.
64The ﬁnal piece of Zerit’s narrative is the growing AIDS epidemic in poorer nations, and the pressure that this
epidemic has placed on those with rights to Zerit to allow for greater access. The combination of eﬀective
medications and strong prevention programs have, to a large extent, contained the spread and morbidity
of AIDS in the United States. But the same cannot be said of the containment of HIV/AIDS in other
parts of the world, and particularly in Africa. As previously mentioned, UNAIDS reported that a staggering
2.3 million Africans died of AIDS in 2001 and that a further 28.1 million Africans are infected with the
virus. In 2000, between 10,000 and 25,000 Africans – fewer than 0.1 percent of those with HIV/AIDS – were
being treated with antiretroviral medicines.185 Harvard economist Jeﬀrey Sachs, Chair of the World Health
Organization (WHO) Advisory Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, said that “it’s as though the
Black Death were going on in Europe in the 14th century, and China were sitting on a cure and saying, ‘Why
should we help?’ We would consider it the crime of the millennium if that had happened, and yet we seem
to be able to accommodate this without much trouble.”186 More speciﬁcally, what we are “accommodating”
is the fact that for many years, even in the face of this awesome epidemic, neither pharmaceutical companies
nor Yale University nor the U.S. government – the three parties that developed Zerit and that possess rights
to Zerit – acted to make Zerit available to African nations at discounted prices.
The enormity of Africa’s AIDS epidemic was recognized in the early 1990s, while Zerit was still undergoing
Phase I and Phase II clinical tests.187 In 1991, the WHO organized a meeting attended by high-level
representatives from 18 large pharmaceutical companies, including BMS. The purpose of the meeting was
to ensure that AIDS medications, once developed and approved, would be made available at a cost that all
185Bill Brubaker, The Limits of $100 Million; Epidemic’s Complexities Curb Impact of Bristol-Myers’s Initiative, Washing-
ton Post, Dec. 29, 2000, at A1.
186Barton Gellman, An Unequal Calculus of Life and Death; As Millions Perished in Pandemic, Firms Debated Access to
Drugs; Players in the Debate Over Drug Availability and Pricing, Washington Post, Dec. 27, 2000, at A1.
187One article reported that at least 10,000 Ugandans had developed AIDS (mainly through heterosexual contact) and nearly
800,000 of the nation’s roughly 17 million citizens were believed to be infected with the virus. Kathleen Hunt, Scenes From a
Nightmare, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1990, at 25.
65countries could aﬀord. Director General Hiroshi Nakajima opened the talks by noting that “By the end of
this decade, there will have been a cumulative total of... 40 million HIV infections – I repeat, 40 million – in
men, women and children. Over 90 percent of these will be in developing countries.”188 But the companies
felt threatened by WHO’s plans to make medications available at low prices. At that time, BMS was about
to receive FDA approval for its ﬁrst AIDS medication, ddI. Rather than work alongside the WHO to develop
a plan to make this medication available to African nations at low prices, BMS Senior Vice President Stephen
Carter downplayed the impact that AIDS might have on the continent relative to other health concerns.189
WHO’s negotiations with private industry made little headway for many years.
Throughout the 1990s, the price of AIDS medications in Africa remained high. Zerit was sold by BMS for
roughly the same price in Africa as in the United States – $3,300 per patient per year. According to generic
producers, the cost of its manufacture and distribution is only $300 per year.190 Why was BMS so reluctant
to act on its own initiative to make the medication available at a lower price?
One explanation might be that BMS wanted to earn proﬁts on sales of Zerit in Africa. This explanation,
however, does not withstand scrutiny. The entire continent of Africa accounts for only 1% of worldwide
sales of pharmaceutical medications. In 1998, it accounted for only 0.03% of BMS’ HIV/AIDS drug sales.191
Certainly BMS was not counting on earning signiﬁcant proﬁt from Zerit in Africa, and in 1998, James
Sapirstein, BMS sales executive in charge of HIV/AIDS global sales, indicated as much: “South Africa was
not a priority. The thinking [was] that we should just write the business oﬀ, that it was impossible, that
there was no money to be made” in Africa.192
188Barton Gellman, supra note 186.
189Id.
190Raquel Pontes de Campos, supra note 72.
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66Another explanation might be that lower prices could not solve the AIDS epidemic. This explanation,
however, also fails to withstand scrutiny. If BMS had oﬀered to sell Zerit at cost, Zerit would have still failed
to reach the vast majority of Africans with AIDS – many African nations spend less than $2 per person
per year on health care. Huge amounts of foreign aid were and continue to be needed, and this aid is spent
primarily on health care infrastructure, education and prevention programs.193 These expenditures, it is
argued, are a more eﬀective way to allocate the available funds.194 This may indeed be true, but it is equally
true that lower drug prices would have left more money in the pot to spend on prevention programs or to
purchase more drugs. Lower prices may not have alone contained the epidemic, but they would have saved
lives.
Rather, the true reason why BMS did not lower its price for Zerit in South Africa was voiced by Michael
Scholtz, a German national who began work for the WHO after 21 years as a manager at Ciba-Geigy and
SmithKline Beecham. Scholtz said that “if cheaper drugs in Africa put downward pressure on the global
price, then the core markets of the pharmaceutical industry are at risk.”195 The problem, in other words,
was the fear that drugs made available at low prices in Africa would ﬁnd their way back into the markets of
richer nations. This would undermine the proﬁts that the pharmaceutical industry earns at home. Absent
adequate assurances that Zerit would not be re-exported back to the United States, BMS refused to ﬂood
the continent with its medication. This is the problem of so-called “parallel imports,” and it aﬀects not only
pharmaceutical drugs but also music, videos, jeans, cars and countless other consumer products.
African nations, meanwhile, desperately needed large quantities of HIV/AIDS medications. Zerit was not
193It is widely recognized that signiﬁcantly more money is necessary to address the AIDS crisis in Africa, and that this money
will simply have to come, if at all, from wealthy nations and citizens. “The brutal fact,” health economist William McGreevey
told an invitation-only World Bank audience on May 22, 1998, was that “those who could pay” for Africa’s AIDS therapy “are
very unlikely to be persuaded to do so.” Barton Gellman, supra note 186.
194In 1997, Jonathan Quick of WHO’s essential medicines program presented a bar graph indicating that $10,000 could be
used to save either 9,900 dehydrated children, hundreds of pneumonia and tuberculosis patients, or one AIDS. Barton Gellman,
supra note 186.
195Id.
67patented in any sub-Saharan African nation (save for South Africa), meaning that these nations could,
had they money, purchase Zerit at cost from generic manufacturers without violating patent law. For
these countries, the problem was one of funding. In South Africa, however, the problem was also one of
patents. Because BMS had not lowered its prices, South Africa desired to use compulsory licenses to either
manufacture the drug themselves (as Brazil was doing) or purchase the drug from generic manufacturers.
Thus in 1997, South Africa proposed a change in its laws that would have allowed for the compulsory licensing
of essential medications. Such a policy is not inconsistent with TRIPS, the WTO provisions pertaining to
international patent protections, but it nevertheless posed a threat to BMS’ proﬁts. Perhaps more than any
other industry, the pharmaceutical relies on patents for proﬁts. Thus BMS and the entire U.S. pharmaceutical
industry, with the backing of the U.S. government, ﬁled suit in South Africa to enjoin the proposed change in
the law.196 The intense lawsuit, which was ﬁnally dropped by the pharmaceutical industry in 2001, delayed
South Africa’s attempts to obtain Zerit at cost.
By 1998, pharmaceutical companies were waking up to the need to address the AIDS epidemic, if only to
protect the goodwill of their brand. In August 1998, Sapirstein conceived of a plan to sell HIV/AIDS drugs,
including Zerit, to the developing world at discounted prices. Poor countries and multinational corporations
(whose employees in foreign countries were being infected by the thousands) would receive discounts ranging
from 10% to 60%.197 Perhaps due to the concern over parallel imports, BMS scrapped this plan and instead
pursued a charitable program focused primarily on education, prevention and medical research. On May 6,
1999 BMS announced the launch of “Secure the Future,” a program to which they committed $100 million
over 5 years.198 Within two years, $44.2 million had already been committed, including a $19.6 million
196Although the move by South Africa was legal under TRIPS, the United States viewed it as a signiﬁcant threat to the
nation’s pharmaceutical industry. The New York Times Magazine reported that the Clinton administration “declared war” on
South Africa and lobbied Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki hard on the issue. Tina Rosenberg, supra note 144, at 52.
197Bill Brubaker, supra note 185.
198Bill Brubaker, supra note 185. Critics note that the actual cost of the program is much lower than $100 million. First, it
is tax-deductible. Second, roughly $33 million of the $100 million total is coming from funds already budgeted for charity that
68clinical trial in Botswana led by the Harvard AIDS Institute.199 This clinical trial is one of the few pieces of
Secure the Future that will actually get medications into the hands of HIV/AIDS patients.
Although Secure the Future was a public-relations victory for BMS, the pharmaceutical industry continued
to receive bad press for its high prices. On December 6, 1999, U.N. Secretary General Koﬁ Annan called
for new “public-private partnerships” to help address the AIDS epidemic. The pharmaceutical industry
responded to the call. So long as their patent rights would not be violated, the industry agreed in May 2000
to the “ACCESS” initiative to lower drug prices. Under the ACCESS initiative, prices of AIDS medications
would be cut in poor countries by 90%.200 Curiously, internal company projections called for increases in
drug production to cover thousands of new patients in Africa, not millions.201 As the production estimates
indicate, ACCESS did not have quite the impact that one might have expected. Eight months after the
program was announced, only one of the ﬁve companies, Glaxo Wellcome, was willing to even disclose its
AIDS medicine discounts.202 Prices, in general, remained well above cost – in December 2000 Zerit cost
$5 per day in South Africa and $6.2 per day in Uganda. This was roughly half of its cost in the United
States, but still well above the rate of 60 cents per day that Brazil obtained by manufacturing generics in
state-owned labs.203 (Brazil, like India but unlike South Africa, does not abide by patents.)
will now be devoted to Secure the Future. And, third, the company can reduce the actual cost by valuing donated Bristol-Myers
drugs at the wholesale prices it charges hospitals, rather than at the company’s much lower manufacturing costs. “Basically,
Bristol-Myers Squibb is investing $100 million to ensure that criticism from important sources is silenced,” said Nathan Geﬀen,
a spokesman for Treatment Action Campaign, a South African AIDS activist group.
199Bill Brubaker, supra note 185.
200Barton Gellman, A Turning Point That Left Millions Behind; Drug Discounts Beneﬁt Few While Protecting Pharmaceutical
Companies’ Proﬁts, Washington Post, Dec. 28, 2000, at A1.
201Barton Gellman, supra note 186.
202Barton Gellman, supra note 200.
203Carmen P´ erez-Casas, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Campaign For Access to Essential Medicines, HIV/AIDS
Medicines Pricing Report, Setting objectives: is there a political will? (Dec. 2000).
69By 2001, millions of Africans had died of AIDS and millions more were infected. Neither Secure the
Future nor the ACCESS initiative had succeeded in dropping the price of Zerit in sub-Saharan Africa, and
particularly in South Africa. The situation was becoming untenable. Early in the year, Cipla, a generic drug
manufacturer located in India, oﬀered to sell to African nations a three-drug cocktail that included Zerit for
$350 per patient per year.204 Meanwhile, a ﬂurry of headlines tarnished the reputation of the pharmaceutical
industry. The slogans of the activists – “Pﬁzer’s Greed Kills,” “Death Under Patent,” “Medical Apartheid”
– went straight to the heart of the industry’s long-standing eﬀorts “to portray itself as being driven by
improving the human condition,” said Michael Artinger of Decision Resources, a pharmaceutical research
ﬁrm.205
In March 2001, James Love, head of the Consumer Project on Technology, an advocacy group founded by
Ralph Nader, pushed for the creation of a nonproﬁt company that could be granted a license to make and
sell a low-cost version of stavudine.206 His proposal relied on the fact that d4T had been developed with
taxpayer funds, and he proposed to ask the government to exercise, for the ﬁrst time ever, its march-in rights
under Bayh-Dole to license d4T to his new nonproﬁt. Meanwhile, student activists at Yale University also
seized upon the fact that d4T was not entirely a BMS product. After all, Yale itself held the patent.207
BMS had at times argued that it could not lower prices because of its agreement with Yale, which held the
patent and beneﬁted from royalty payments.208 Thus student activists called on Yale to grant additional
204Raquel Pontes de Campos, supra note 72.
205Barton Gellman, supra note 200. In addition, the pharmaceutical industry has also received negative press due to a
perception that prescription drug prices are too high. In 2000, for the ﬁrst time since 1995, shareholders brought resolutions
asking drug companies to “create and implement a policy of price restraint on pharmaceutical products for individual consumers
and institutional purchasers.” The proposal also asked for a report to shareholders on what eﬀorts had been made to make
products available “at reasonable cost.” The shareholder vote at BMS, sponsored by the Sinsinawa Dominicans, Sisters of
St. Francis/Assissi, and Catholic Healthcare West, obtained 5% of the shareholder vote. Investor Responsibility Research
Center, Social Policy Shareholder Resolutions in 2000: Issues, Votes and Views of Institutional Investors (Jan.
2001).
206Raquel Pontes de Campos, supra note 72.
207Donald G. McNeil Jr., Yale Pressed to Help Cut Drug Costs in Africa, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2001, at A3.
208Karen DeYoung & Bill Brubaker, Another Firm Cuts HIV Drug Prices; Sub-Saharan Africa Is the Focus of Bristol-Myers
70licenses to manufacture and distribute d4T in Africa (in breach of Yale’s contract with BMS). Yale refused
to breach its contract but ultimately reached an agreement with BMS to “remove any obstacles” on patent
and pricing issues. Yale spokesman Tom Conway stated that “as far as Yale is concerned, anybody who
wants to give [Zerit] away, all the time, it’s ﬁne with us.”209 Interestingly, the eﬀorts by James Love and the
students at Yale were the ﬁrst to incorporate into their activism the leverage created by the fact that both
taxpayers and Yale contributed to the drug’s development and retained certain rights to the medication.
On March 14, BMS ﬁnally yielded to the mounting pressure and announced that Zerit would be made available
in Africa for 15 cents per day. Together with Videx (or ddI), the cost would be $1 per day.210 The company
calculated that this move would raise its total charitable commitment to Secure the Future from $100 million
to $115 million. “This is not about proﬁts and patents; it’s about poverty and a devastating disease,” said
John L. McGoldrick, executive vice president, Bristol-Myers Squibb. “We seek no proﬁts on AIDS drugs in
Africa, and we will not let our patents be an obstacle.”211 After this announcement, the price of Zerit in
South Africa slowly began to drop. At the time of this writing, one year later, there is evidence that Zerit is
now available in South Africa roughly at cost.
Of course, BMS and Yale were not the only parties with rights to Zerit – the U.S. government also retained
rights to the medication. It is thus worth looking at the U.S. response to the AIDS epidemic in poorer nations.
While poorer nations demanded that the international framework soften patent rights when necessary to
Move, Washington Post, Mar. 15, 2001, at A1.
209Id.
210The NIH licensed ddI (Videx) to BMS on the condition that the drug be made available at a fair price, but this clause “has
never been enforced.” Tina Rosenberg, supra note 144, at 52.
211Melody Petersen & Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Maker Yielding Patent in Africa For AIDS Drug, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2001,
at A1. See also Melody Petersen, Abbott to Sell Low-Cost AIDS Drugs in Africa, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2001, at C9; and
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71respond to health crises, richer nations, including the U.S., resisted these eﬀorts. In April 2000, Brazil
brought forward a nonbinding resolution to the U.N. Human Rights Commission asking that international
agreements be “supportive of public-health policies” that promote aﬀordable drugs and medical technologies.
On April 23, 52 countries on the 53-member commission approved the proposal. The U.S. abstained. Then,
in May, a WHO proposal to make drugs available at low prices failed under pressure from the United States.
The U.S. recharacterized the health issue as a trade issue, arguing that the WTO, and not the WHO, should
handle the issue.212
Meanwhile, at the WTO, the U.S. lobbied aggressively for a strong international patent regime. Excep-
tions in times of health crises were resisted. That is, they were resisted until the U.S., when faced with an
anthrax scare at home, threatened to violate Bayer’s patent on Cipro. The hypocrisy of its position was
untenable, and at the Doha round of WTO negotiations, poorer nations won a mild concession. Speciﬁcally,
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement authorizes nations to manufacture generics for their own
population when necessary to alleviate a major health crisis.213 The eﬀect of this provision is likely to be
minimal, as few poor nations have the capacity to manufacture their own generics.
Meanwhile, throughout the epidemic the government declined to act upon its rights to the AIDS medica-
tions developed in part with government funding. On September 3, 1999, James Love and Ralph Nader sent
a letter to Dr. Harold Varmus, Director of the NIH, asking the NIH to exercise its rights in government-
funded inventions by granting a license to manufacture these medications to the WHO.214 Speciﬁcally, they
noted that the U.S. government possesses an:
212Raquel Pontes de Campos, supra note 72.
213World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, Declaration on the TRIPS agree-
ment and public health (Nov. 14, 2001). See also Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry
Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World
Countries, U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1069 (Winter 1996).
214Letter from Ralph Nader, James Love, & Robert Weissman to Dr. Harold Varmus, Director of NIH (Sept. 3, 1999) (asking
for NIH to give the World Health Organization, WHO, access to US government funded medical inventions) (the full text of
the letter is available at <http://www.cptech.org>).
72irrevocable, royalty-free right of the Government of the United States to practice and have
practiced the invention on behalf of the United States and on behalf of any foreign government
or international organization pursuant to any existing or future treaty or agreement with the
United States. 37CFR404.7(a)(2)(i)
Varmus declined to do so. In his response to the proposal, Varmus wrote that “in principle, the U.S.
government can license patent rights to the WHO.... [But,] I do not believe that the lack of such a license
from the NIH is inhibiting developing countries from addressing their needs. As you stated, many of these
countries can issue compulsory licenses, and those that have not enacted that authority to date can do so
if they choose.... The role of NIH in these sovereign matters is, appropriately, extremely limited.”215 Two
aspects of Varmus’ response are startling. First, Varmus’ response indicates that the executive branch was,
in the handling of Zerit, simply not on the same page. Varmus argued that given South Africa’s capacity to
pass compulsory licensing legislation, granting a license to the WHO was unnecessary. Meanwhile, however,
other members of the Clinton administration were actively trying to block such legislation from coming into
force. Second, Varmus’ desire to limit the role of the NIH in these complicated “sovereign” aﬀairs runs
contrary to the express terms of Bayh-Dole, which grants to the funding agencies alone the authority to
exercise march-in rights. Taxpayers retain rights to essential medicines like Zerit, and at times national
security and global equity might call for their exercise. If the NIH is not making this calculation on behalf
of taxpayers, then who is? This issue will be further explored in the following section, along with numerous
other issues pertaining to tech transfer that have been raised by the narrative account of Zerit’s development.
215Letter from Dr. Harold Varmus, Director of NIH, to Ralph Nader, James Love & Robert Weissman (Oct. 19, 1999)
(responding to their request calling on the NIH to provide the World Health Organization (WHO), access to government-
funded medical inventions) (the full text of this letter is available at <http://www.cptech.org>).
73IV.
Zerit’s Implications for the Direction of Technology Transfer Policy
This section of the article uses the narrative of Zerit to inform current debates over the direction of technology
transfer. Generally speaking, Zerit indicates that technology transfer policy is working well. A health crisis
emerged, and the government responded. Throughout the 1980s, government funding for AIDS prevention,
education and medical research increased dramatically (though, admittedly, not fast enough for some).
Scientists at NIH labs in Bethesda performed critical foundational research. Scientists at universities, funded
both by the government and by private industry, focused their attention on compounds with potential
activity against the AIDS retrovirus. When a promising compound was discovered, Bristol-Myers negotiated
an exclusive license and committed to seeing the drug through the clinical trials process. To help speed
this process along, the government chipped in funds, approved Zerit for “investigational use,” and expedited
the FDA approval process. Just ﬁve years after the clinical trials began, Zerit was on the market. Zerit’s
development largely corroborates the conventional wisdom regarding Bayh-Dole’s success.
At the same time, Zerit also reveals that some tinkering may be in order. Adjustments to the policy are
possible to make because tech transfer, like the R&D that it regulates, is in a near constant state ﬂux. Of
course, Zerit is only one example of how technology transfer is operating in practice; one must take care
not extrapolate too much from this single narrative. Nevertheless, it can be used to shed light on the three
current questions pertaining to tech transfer that were presented in Section II. The narrative also reveals
that a few questions should be added to the list.
IV.A. The Three Current Questions Revisited
74IV.A.1. Are Exclusive Licenses Necessary to Ensure Commercialization of
Government-Funded Inventions?
Zerit seems to indicate that exclusive licenses are indeed necessary to ensure commercializa-
tion. The cost to BMS of developing Zerit is estimated to be in the neighborhood of $150
million to $300 million.216 This is less than the average cost of developing a new drug, mostly
due to increased government support for the development of AIDS medications. It is never-
theless a large chunk of change. No company would undertake such an expenditure without
the security of knowing that they would enjoy, for some period of time, market exclusivity in
rich nations.
Perhaps in the 1940s and 1950s, when the clinical testing and approval processes mandated by the FDA
were less stringent, nonexclusive licenses were enough to do the trick. Zerit, however, indicates that by
the late 1980s this was no longer the case. The only way d4T might have reached the market, absent an
exclusive license, would have been for the government to take the drug all the way through the clinical
trials and approval process itself, and then to license it to a generic manufacturer for distribution. Among
medications, an AIDS medication would have been a strong candidate for this. First, there was signiﬁcant
pressure on the U.S. government to expend resources developing AIDS drugs. Particularly in the early
1990s, when Zerit was undergoing clinical trials, pressure on the government to devote more resources to
AIDS was considerable. Second, because of the high level of awareness within the AIDS community of the
drugs in the pipeline, Zerit needed very little in the way of advertising and promotion. These activities are
typically thought better done by private entities than by public, but, here, perhaps the government could
have handled it. Nevertheless, the government chose not to follow this path, and it does not appear likely
216See discussion supra page 75.
75the government will do so in the near future. Assuming it does not, exclusive licenses may be necessary to
ensure commercialization.
IV.A.2. Are Taxpayers Maximizing the Return on Their Investment?
Zerit indicates that taxpayers are getting a signiﬁcant return on their investment, but that they are not
maximizing their return. Access to Zerit is a signiﬁcant taxpayer return, and it is enjoyed by virtually all
U.S. citizens (save for the small number falling in the cracks between Medicaid and ADAP). Tax revenues
obtained from sales on Zerit are another signiﬁcant return. However, the proﬁt that BMS has earned on
Zerit far exceeds that necessary to have ensured commercialization. A high estimate of the cost to BMS
of Zerit’s development is $300 million. By the end of 2000, BMS’ revenues on sales of Zerit exceeded $2.3
billion. The patent continues to run until 2008. Needless to say, this is a remarkable return on investment.
It is fair to say that had BMS known a priori that its revenues would have been only $1 billion, it still
would have been in the company’s interest to spend $300 million on the drug’s development. It follows that
BMS has beneﬁted and continues to beneﬁt from a sizeable windfall. (The story of Zerit reveals, perhaps,
why in the 1990s biotech industry proﬁts exceeded those of all other industries.)217 Some of this corporate
windfall might be funneled back into R&D on other medications. Some might be returned to shareholders.
But why should the company’s managers and shareholders be the ones deciding how this windfall will be
spent? Shouldn’t this money have remained in the hands of consumers?
One comprehensive way to reign in this corporate windfall would be for Congress to pass the Sanders
217Barton Gellman, supra note 200.
76amendment.218 An easier path, and one that would not require congressional action on new legislation but
rather implementation of existing legislation, would simply be the exercise of (or even the credible threat
of exercising) march-in rights. March-in rights were, after all, designed to prevent exactly the corporate
windfall that BMS is currently enjoying. It can reasonably be argued that BMS has not achieved “practical
application” in the marketplace because they are not making Zerit available on “reasonable terms.” Exercise
of march-in rights would not, in this instance, require establishing a formula for what constitutes a reasonable
price. Rather, one need merely ﬁnd that revenues exceeding $2.3 billion on a government-funded drug that
cost private industry roughly $300 million to develop is a prima facie case of unreasonability.
There are two reasons to believe why the occasional, judicious use of march-in rights will not chill
industry’s willingness to commercialize government-funded inventions. First, when Bristol-Myers originally
negotiated its exclusive license for Zerit in 1988, the Bayh-Dole regime was only eight years old. At that
time, there was still reason to believe that the march-in rights had teeth, yet, Bristol-Myers went ahead with
the drug’s development anyway. Second, the government simply plays too big a role in foundational R&D
for private industry to completely walk away from the table. So long as a calculation of “reasonable terms”
allows for a reasonable proﬁt – a proﬁt high enough to entice commercialization – then government-funded
inventions will not be left to languish in government and university labs.
It is also worth noting that the lack of a reasonable pricing mechanism like that contained in the march-in
provisions may be creating a disincentive for private industry to spend capital on R&D. Under the current
regime, greater private investment in the development of a government-funded drug is not rewarded with
greater property rights (such as a longer patent term). Thus BMS had no incentive to contribute more to
218A discussion of this amendment is provided, supra note 107.
77Zerit’s development. Indeed industry has every incentive to sit back and wait for the government to push
the R&D along. This is especially true in the case of essential medicines (such as Zerit) where the company
knows that the government is under pressure to speed drugs through the clinical testing and FDA approval
process. If instead pricing requirements were keyed to the extent of industry’s role in the development
process, then industry would have a greater incentive to expand their role in collaborative research.
In addition to exercising march-in rights, the government should also act to maximize the taxpayer return on
investment by implementing and enforcing more stringent disclosure requirements. The proposal put forth
by the NIH is a positive step in this direction.219 The proposal put forth by TACD would be even better.220
There is reason to believe that were BMS forced to disclose its actual expenditures on Zerit, maintaining the
company’s goodwill would require maintaining a reasonable pricing strategy.
IV.A.3. Is Technology Transfer Facilitating Research in a Way That Maximizes Human Health?
Zerit serves as a reminder that scientiﬁc progress often depends on openness. When neither Dr. Prusoﬀ
nor Bristol-Myers possessed the technical capacity to test d4T for activity against the AIDS retrovirus, they
turned ﬁrst to the NIH and then to Emory University for assistance. In 1986, Dr. Prusoﬀ never imagined
that he might someday earn millions of dollars from sales of d4T. Today, this possibility is not only recognized
by scientists, but it often drives their research. Under these circumstances, would Dr. Prusoﬀ have been so
willing to collaborate with Dr. Schinazi at Emory?
219NIH Response, supra note 5, at 14.
220Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, supra note 121.
78If, as some critics suggest, university scientists are becoming increasingly reluctant to exchange information,
then medications like Zerit may take longer to develop. Thus the warnings of these critics should be inves-
tigated and taken very seriously. Two areas of information exchange in particular warrant attention. First,
more attention should be given to “material transfer agreements” (MTAs), the agreements that regulate the
process by which researchers share information. There is some evidence that research is being impeded by the
fact that corporations and universities each have their own, complicated MTAs.221 The government should
push for greater uniformity in the ﬁeld, and should also push for maximum openness in MTAs involving
federally-funded inventions.
Second, greater consideration should be given to university conﬂicts of interest policies. It was very important
to Dr. Prusoﬀ that Bristol-Myers’ initial grant of $500,000 to Yale University (given in exchange for a right
of ﬁrst refusal) came with no strings attached. The university scientists maintained complete academic
freedom. Academic freedom must be preserved and, more importantly, the potential for personal proﬁt must
not be allowed to interfere with the purposes of academic research.
IV.B. Adding Two More Questions to the List
The narrative of Zerit further reveals that two more questions should be added to the current debates over
the future of tech transfer.
IV.B.1. What are the International Implications of Tech Transfer?
221Paulette Walker Campbell, Pacts Between Universities and Companies Worry Federal Oﬃcials; Research agencies fear
that the restrictions in some agreements may impede scientiﬁc progress, Chronicle of Higher Education, May 15, 1998, at
A37.
79Technology transfer is an international issue. It is a national security issue. It is a health issue. And it is
an ethical issue. It is not, as the United States argued before the WHO, only an issue of international trade.
U.S citizens are paying to support biomedical R&D and, based on their investment, they retain certain
rights to their invention. The decision on when and exactly how to exercise these rights should be made by
government oﬃcials who consider all of the relevant issues. Taxpayers deserve no less.
Zerit indicates that no arm of the executive branch is conducting this calculus on behalf of U.S. citizens.
Dr. Varmus, Director of the NIH, declined to help alleviate the AIDS epidemic in Africa by licensing stavudine
to either the WHO or a nonproﬁt organization (that would have sold the drug to African nations at cost).
Varmus acknowledged that, under Bayh-Dole, the government retains the right to do so. Nevertheless,
Varmus decided that the role of the NIH in these “sovereign matters” is “extremely limited.”222 Considering
that Bayh-Dole expressly asks the directors of funding agencies (like the NIH) to oversee the exercise of the
government’s retained rights, Varmus’ position amounts to an abdication of executive authority. Under the
terms of Bayh-Dole, the role of the NIH is anything but “limited” – indeed the NIH is the agency endowed
with this power. The NIH must assert, in accordance with the express language of Bayh-Dole, the power
to exercise march-in rights on behalf of U.S. citizens. If not, action must be taken to bestow this power
elsewhere in the administration.
It is also worth noting that while the NIH abdicated its Bayh-Dole responsibilities, no other arm of the
executive branch stepped in to ﬁll the gap. Indeed Zerit reveals that diﬀerent arms of the executive branch
were in fact working at cross-purposes. Varmus argued that because African nations could have pursued
compulsory licenses on their own, additional licensing was unnecessary. Meanwhile, the Department of
222Letter from Dr. Harold Varmus, supra note 215.
80Commerce and the highest levels of the Clinton administration lobbied to prevent South Africa from passing
just such a scheme.
Finally, Zerit reveals that when the NIH does, in the future, take a hard look at whether to exercise march-
in rights, it must take care not to confuse the issue of patents from the issue of parallel importation. The
administration’s opposition to South Africa’s scheme of compulsory licensing is a patent issue – compulsory
licenses, though valid under TRIPS, pose a threat to the proﬁts derived from patents. The issue of pricing
– the issue at the heart of the government’s case to exercise march-in rights – is not a patent issue. Rather,
it is an issue of parallel importation. All across sub-Saharan Africa, BMS priced Zerit at well over cost.
The BMS pricing strategy was driven by the fear that the drug would ﬁnd its way back into the U.S., thus
undermining the company’s critical base of sales. There is some reason to doubt this fear. After all, Brazil
and India have both been producing large quantities of stavudine, and there is little evidence that these
pills have found their way back into the U.S. Nevertheless, the issue of parallel importation is an important
one.223 As Zerit indicates, it is certain to play a role in any situation where a poor country needs access to
a drug that is being sold elsewhere at a high price. When the next such situation arises, the government
would do well to distinguish this issue from the issue of patents.
IV.B.2. Should Diﬀerent Drugs Receive Identical Treatment Under Tech Transfer?
Zerit indicates that tech transfer could be made more eﬀective by distinguishing drugs developed in response
to major epidemics from other drugs. Such a policy has two justiﬁcations. First, drugs developed in response
to major epidemics are likely to be the subject of more challenging ethical and humanitarian pressures.
223For information on the current debate over parallel importation, see, e.g., Editorial, Importing Cheaper Drugs, N.Y Times,
Sept. 29, 2000; <http://www.wipo.int>; <http://www.cptech.org>.
81Second, these drugs are likely to be the product of greater than average public support. Communities
aﬀected by the AIDS epidemic placed extraordinary pressure on the U.S. government to act. Within just a
few years, government support for foundational AIDS research jumped by several hundred million dollars.224
And the government’s support did not stop there. By 1990, taxpayers had contributed $428 million to the
AIDS Clinical Trials Group.225And, due to the extent of the epidemic, the government also contributed in
other ways: The FDA granted Zerit “parallel track” status, enabling for relatively inexpensive clinical testing
on over 13,000 patients; and, the FDA expedited the approval of Zerit, an essential medicine, by requiring
that Phase III testing achieve only a surrogate, and not a ﬁnal, endpoint.
Because essential medications like Zerit are both the subject of heightened ethical considerations and
the product of greater-than-average government support, these medicines should be subject to greater
government-retained rights. There are strong reasons why march-in rights should be exercised in the case of
Zerit, and the same might be expected of other essential medicines. However, exercising these rights might
instill fear in industry, the fear that the government will begin to exercise these rights in lots of other med-
ications. Distinguishing essential medicines from other medicines will strengthen tech transfer by enabling
the government to exercise their rights in the former without threatening private industry’s investment in
the latter.
224AIDS in the Third World, supra note 138.
225Philip Hilts, Panel Issues Broad Attack on U.S. Response to AIDS, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1990, at B4.
82V.
Conclusion
Twenty years have passed since the Bayh-Dole Act fundamentally altered the government’s approach to
technology transfer. This legislation encouraged the use of exclusive licenses to stimulate private investment
in the commercialization of government-funded inventions. It is widely recognized that the Act has succeeded
in achieving this goal. Scientists operating with federal funds are increasingly attuned to the commercial
applications of their work. The number of FDA-approved medications has skyrocketed, and there are now
hundreds of small biotech ﬁrms pushing potential medications through the product pipeline.
The development of Zerit conﬁrms that the Bayh-Dole Act is a success. Nevertheless, Zerit also indicates
that some tinkering may be in order. Such tinkering is possible to enact, for technology transfer policy,
like the R&D that it regulates, is the subject of near-constant tinkering. Speciﬁcally, Zerit indicates that
taxpayers are not maximizing the return on their investment, for, under current policy, private industry is
able to earn proﬁts in excess of those that are necessary to induce commercialization. In the case of Zerit,
Bristol-Myers Squibb turned a $300 million investment in a taxpayer-funded medication into more than $2.3
billion in revenue, and this in the midst of a staggering AIDS epidemic.
To the current debates over the direction of tech transfer policy, the story of Zerit adds two important
considerations. First, when citizens pay for biomedical R&D, they retain rights to the subject invention.
The government has a responsibility to act upon these rights in accord with public health, national security,
international trade and ethical and moral responsibility. Bayh-Dole entrusts the NIH with the power to make
83this calculation, but, in the case of Zerit, the NIH abdicated its critical role. Either the NIH must assume
its obligation to make this diﬃcult calculation, or, this responsibility should be delegated to another arm
of the executive branch. Second, it might be possible and indeed preferable for tech transfer to distinguish
essential medicines from other medicines. The former are likely to be the product of increased government
support and the target of increased demand for access. Distinguishing them from other medications would
enable the government to act upon their retained rights to these essential medications without upsetting the
balance of rights at play in other medications.
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